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transcript file

Report of Proceedings

INVENTORIED: ON 3/2/77 BY EL

Hearing held before

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

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Tuesday, August 19, 1975

Washington, D. C.

(Stenotype Tape and Waste turned over to the Committee for destruction)

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C O N T E N T S

(Witness: Halley)

EXHIBITS

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STAFF INTERVIEW

- - -

Tuesday, August 19, 1975

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United States Senate,
Select Committee to Study Governmental
Operations With Respect to
Intelligence Activities,
Washington, D.C.

The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 1:25 o'clock p.m. in Room 608, The Carroll Arms.

Staff: Frederick Baron, Joseph diGenova, Professional Staff Members.

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P R O C E E D I N G S

Mr. Baron. Mr. Halley, is it true that you are here testifying today under alias, and that Halley is not actually your true identity?

Mr. Halley. That is correct.

Mr. Baron. Your true identity will be on file with the review staff of the CIA and available for verification by the Committee if that becomes necessary?

Mr. Halley. That is my understanding.

Mr. Baron. Let me show you a piece of paper marked "Statement Regarding Testimony and Alias" and let me ask you whether this is the statement you signed as we were beginning here today which indicates your true identity and which I have witnessed?

Mr. Halley. Yes, that is the correct statement that I signed today. There is a blank there where we have not filled in the Senator's name.

Mr. Baron. All right.

For the moment, let us leave that blank and enter it into the record as is, as Exhibit 1.

(The document referred to was marked Halley Exhibit No. 1 for identification.)

Mr. Baron. It is your understanding, is it not, that we have worked out an arrangement with the review staff whereby the statement will be attached to your transcript as an Exhibit and in a sanitized form, leaving out either of the two references to your true identity which will only be available at this Agency.

Mr. Halley. That is my understanding.

Mr. Baron. Are you aware that you have the right to counsel before the Committee?

Mr. Halley. Yes, I am.

Mr. Baron. Are you appearing here, voluntarily here today without counsel?

Mr. Halley. Yes, I am.

Mr. Baron. Are you also aware that at any point you are entitled to cease answering any questions and consult with counsel if you wish?

Mr. Halley. Yes, I am aware of that.

Mr. Baron. Finally, are you aware that all your Constitutional rights are intact before the Committee here today, including your Fifth Amendment rights to remain silent?

Mr. Halley. Yes, I am.

Mr. Baron. I think we should put into the record the arrangement that we made before we began, and correct me if this is not your understanding of the arrangement, that we are testifying here today without placing you under oath because

there is no Senator available for that purpose, but both you and I are contemplating having a Senator swear you in and ask you if your transcript is true to the best of your knowledge at some point as soon as possible as it can be arranged after today's session.

Mr. Halley. Yes. The statement that you have just made is my understanding of the agreement that we entered into prior to this conversation going on the record.

Mr. Baron. Thank you.

Let us begin then with some very broad questions about your background in the Agency. Can you tell me what you were doing in the Agency prior to your involvement with the JMWAVE station?

Mr. Halley. I became involved with the Cuban affair in approximately February of 1962. At that time, I was in Headquarters. I was Chief of Foreign Intelligence Activities for the Eastern European Division. I was asked to be released from those duties to conduct a survey of the opportunities for running intelligence operations against Cuba. I was released from those duties; I did engage in a survey of the possibilities for running intelligence, counterintelligence, paramilitary operations against Cuba.

Mr. Baron. Your position as Chief of Foreign Intelligence for Eastern Europe did not involve Cuba in any way? That was your last position before you became involved in Cuban affairs,

is that correct?

Mr. Halley. That is correct.

I want to qualify that. Undoubtedly, there were some actions that were being conducted in the Eastern European area that reflected on Cuba, but I was not involved in the Bay of Pigs operation. I was not fully focused on Cuban operations until approximately February of 1962.

Mr. Baron. At what point did you join the Agency?

Mr. Halley. I joined the Agency originally in 1951.

Mr. Baron. In a very general way, can you describe the nature of your activities at the Agency prior to February of '62?

Mr. Halley. When I was first assigned to the Agency, I was an Army officer on active duty. I went through the usual Agency training program. I was assigned to Eastern European activities where I originally was focused on Polish and German operations.

I subsequently served from 1952 to 1959 in Germany. In the course of that service, I spent most of my time working on the Eastern European satellites, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria. In addition, I was involved on occasion in Soviet operations and East German operations.

Mr. Baron. Did you have any involvement in Latin American affairs prior to February of '62?

Mr. Halley. Yes. In the period 1960-62, I was responsible for setting up operational activity in Latin America that was targetted more explicitly on the Eastern European satellites

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to some extent on the Soviet Union. This was in a period of time where the Eastern European satellites were expanding their presence in Latin America. In my duties in the Eastern European Division, I was responsible for getting this program going in Latin America, so I did have an extensive exposure to Latin America in the period '60 to '62, as I recall those dates.

The accuracy of those dates can be checked from my official travel records, and so on.

Mr. Baron. During that period of time you were actually in Latin America helping to set up this program?

Mr. Halley. No, I was stationed in Washington, but I travelled to Latin America during this particular period of time.

Mr. Baron. Did you travel to Cuba at any point during the course of that operation?

Mr. Halley. Not specifically. I think I transitted Cuba on air stops being routed to various countries. I think I was at one or two Cuban airfields, but simply in transit.

Mr. Baron. Not long enough even to talk to the people at the Station in Cuba?

Mr. Halley. No, I had no contact at any time with the Havana Station.

Mr. Baron. Did you pick up, during this period of time, a general sense of the attitude of Latin American governments toward the Castro government? Could you characterize that

attitude, if you did?

Mr. Halley. I certainly was aware, I think, of the broad political trend in the Hemisphere at that time, my interest was much more narrowly focused at that time on the Eastern European targets, and on the Soviet target, and I was not certainly specializing in Cuban affairs at that juncture.

Mr. Baron. Cuba was not viewed at that juncture as part of the Soviet target, as a Soviet satellite?

Mr. Halley. No, it was not.

Mr. Baron. Coming then to February of '62, is that the point at which you joined the JMWAVE Station in Miami?

Mr. Halley. No. When I first entered into this survey, it was to do this on a TDY basis, temporary duty assignment, to complete a report on my findings, to report those at that particular juncture to Mr. Harvey who was the head of the Task Force that was attempting to expand intelligence coverage of Cuba and I was not assigned to the station at that particular point in time.

Mr. Baron. At what point did you join the JMWAVE Station?

Mr. Halley. Shortly after having completed this survey. These dates are blurred now because the survey soon turned into a permanent assignment. I would have to check the exact dates from my service records, but after having completed the survey report, shortly thereafter I was asked to go to Miami to become permanently assigned to the station in Miami. I do not recall

the exact date at which that permanent change of station took place.

Mr. Baron. Would you assume that that was sometime before the end of May of '62?

Mr. Halley. Yes. It was probably before that, but as I say, there are a couple of weeks gap that we would have to look at my service record to get the exact dates, but certainly it could have been March, it could have been April. But I reserve, you know, the right to check my record if that is a critical point in terms of what you are trying to establish.

Mr. Baron. Certainly.

I should say generally at this point, if anything we cover today gives you that kind of problem it would be immensely helpful to us if you would check your answers against documents that might be available in the CIA.

Mr. Halley. Yes, all right.

Mr. Baron. In fact, let me ask you if you would check that one out, because it would be useful to know exactly when you joined the JMWAVE station.

During the period of time before you joined JMWAVE, while you were conducting the survey, did you report to anyone other than William Harvey?

Mr. Halley. In a formal sense, this TDY was conducted on behalf of the task force commander, who was Mr. Harvey. While I was in Miami conducting the survey, I obviously discussed

matters pertaining to that survey to the team who was then in charge of the operational activity in Miami. That team was essentially headed by Mr. Al Cox,.who has since died.

Mr. Baron. Was that team the equivalent of JMWAVE station?

Mr. Halley. Yes. Mr. Cox was the head, then, of what would be the equivalent of the JMWAVE Station.

Mr. Baron. Was he the head of JMWAVE until the point when you replaced him, or until the point you became Chief of the JMWAVE Station?

Mr. Halley. That is correct. He was the head of that unit until such time as I replaced him.

Mr. Baron. Were you aware during this survey that you were conducting of any link between Task Force W and the so-called Special Group in the White House which was part of the National Security Council structure and used the project named MONGOOSE for anti-Cuban operations?

Mr. Halley. My understanding at the time that I conducted this survey was that there was a three-man group in existence which was headed by Mr. Robert Kennedy that was conducting a survey to see what kind of activities could be conducted against Cuba. The other members of that particular group were General Lansdale and Mr. Helms.

This three-man group had subordinate to it for all practical purposes the task force unit which was managed by Mr. Harvey. I am not familiar, however, with the other terminology that you

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used, that is Project MONGOOSE, or whatever you said. I do not know the exact words you used. I am not familiar with that terminology.

Mr Baron. During the whole period of your involvement with JMWAVE, you were not made aware of Project MONGOOSE as such?

Mr. Halley. I am not aware of Project MONGOOSE. I do not recall it as an acronym, cryptonym or anything else that was in common usage in my conversations.

Also, you have to understand that during that particular time, Mr. Harvey was subordinate to the normal Agency chain of command. In other words, he had parallel lines, if you will. There was this three-man Task Force to whom he was reporting regularly. At the same time, as the Task Force Commander, he was reporting to the then-DDP who was Mr. Helms.

Mr Baron. You began your survey just about the time that Mr. Helms replaced Mr. Bissell as DDP?

Mr. Halley. That is right.

Mr. Baron. Were you aware of the command relationship between the three-man group that you have mentioned and William Harvey as head of Task Force W? Did that group task Harvey directly, or did Harvey's assignments have to come through Helms and through the DCI as opposed to this group that did not include the DCI?

Mr. Halley. My understanding of it at the time was we were

really talking about parallel lines. In other words, this three-man group was meeting. Mr. Helms was both a member of that particular group and the DDP. Therefore, when he came back from one of these meetings and issued instructions to Mr. Harvey, it was, you know, tantamount to these things coming through two channels simultaneously, one coming from this three-man task force and the other instruction simultaneously coming from Mr. Helms who was the DDP.

Mr. Baron. As far as Mr. Harvey was concerned, an assignment or order from Richard Helms was an order to be taken at face value? Harvey did not have to question whether it had the stamp of approval from the DCI or not? Would that have been your operating understanding?

Mr. Halley. That would have been my understanding, yes. Certainly an instruction received from Mr. Helms was a valid Agency instruction.

Mr. Baron. The DCI at this point was John McCone.

Mr. Halley. That is correct.

Mr. Baron. Do you have any knowledge of the relationship between this three-man group and John McCone at that point?

Mr. Halley. Not on a day to day basis. Once I went to Miami, I came back on a regular basis to review operational plans and programs. On one occasion I accompanied Mr. McCone to the White House to give a presentation or sit in while the presentation was being made.

Mr. Baron. Where was this? What was the forum in which the presentation was made.

Mr. Halley. This was a meeting with President Kennedy and other members of the then-Cabinet were present at that particular meeting.

Mr. Baron. Was that a Cabinet meeting or was it a Special Group meeting as a sub-unit of the National Security Council?

Mr. Halley. You know, that happened in 1962. This is 1975. I do not recall then with precision as to whether it was a meeting of the Cabinet or whether it was a meeting of the National Security Council, or whether it was a meeting of the Special Group.

Mr. Baron. That is perfectly understandable. Do you recall which Cabinet members were present at that meeting?

Mr. Halley. Yes. My recollection of that was that Mr. McNamara was present, Mr. Rusk was present, Mr. Kennedy, the Attorney General, was present. You know, I am just vague now at this particular point. Those are the ones that stick out in my memory as being present.

Mr. Baron. Was the DCI present?

Mr. Halley. Yes, the DCI was present, and he gave a portion of the presentation. As I recall, Mr. FitzGerald gave the other portion of the presentation.

Mr. Baron. Who at that point replaced William Harvey as Chief of Task Force W?

Mr. Halley. Right. You know, the chronology of the Chiefs of our Task Force were that it was Harvey, then FitzGerald, then Screber, after that, Hart. I served with all four of those. This was a very active period, you know, with precision, I cannot outline for you today the dates when Harvey left and FitzGerald took over, you know, when FitzGerald left and Screber took over and so forth. This is something that I would have to research to give you the precise dates.

Mr. Baron. What was the substance of this meeting that they had in which the President was present?

Mr. Halley. This was a general review of activities that were being conducted against Cuba.

Mr. Baron. Was there any mention of any assassination effort at that meeting?

Mr. Halley. No, there was not.

Mr. Baron. You were attending at that point in connection with the survey you conducted?

Mr. Halley. No. I was attending at that point as the Station Chief from Miami in order to make a contribution to the issues that were being discussed, to the fact that detailed, substantive back-up for whatever questions might be put to the Agency spokesmen. I made reference to that because you asked me if I knew the relationship between Mr. McCone and this three-man group. I said no, on a day-to-day basis I did not know the relationship, but that there were meetings that were

attended by me in which Mr. McCone was talking to individuals like Mr. Kennedy, the Attorney General, who was a member of that group.

Mr. Baron. Were you aware that that group might have gone by any particular name or designation?

Mr. Halley. No, I am not.

Mr. Baron. You are not familiar with the term Special Group?

Mr. Halley. Yes, I am aware of the term Special Group. I am aware that the chronology of the 303 Committee, Special Group, 40 Committee and so forth, but as I mentioned to you earlier, that particular time, I cannot distinguish between whether this was an ad hoc meeting or this was a Special Group meeting, or what it was.

Mr. Baron. Did you assume at that time that the three-man group that you referred to, including the Attorney General, General Lansdale and Richard Helms, had a formal relationship to this larger Special Group? In other words, was that three-man group a kind of decision-making sub-unit of the Special Group, or do you think it operated entirely independent from the National Security Council structure.

Mr. Halley. I do not think I can give you an authoritative answer to that. I would go back to what I previously told you. When I entered into this project in February of '62, the chain of command that I was familiar with was this three-man

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group in constant contact with Mr. Harvey. The second chain of command, paralleling that, was Mr. Harvey reporting to the DDP and the DDP subsequently reporting through his chain of command to the Director, and that would be the only way that I could characterize that with any accuracy.

Mr. Baron. Did those two chains of command continue as the channels of decision-making and tasking when you were -- or during your tenure as Chief of Station at JMWAVE?

Mr. Halley. That relationship changed, and again I do not have the date at my fingertips at what time that changed.

I know that shortly thereafter I was in Miami, General Lansdale came down to visit me, to talk with me, about the progress that was being made in the operational program. At some point after that, this three-man group for all intents and purposes disappeared. General Lansdale was reassigned; the group broke up; subsequent reviews of the program were made at the Special Group level. As an example, we would have to submit every month the number of operations that we were going to run, such as infiltrations into Cuba through what would be paramilitary means, and these were approved by the Special Group. There was an approval procedure for setting those up, so subsequently the three-man group disappeared and the regular mechanism of the Special Group came into play.

I am sorry, I cannot give you a precise date for that change, but I am sure it is in the record and I am sure you even

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have the date because the Agency has been researching all sorts of material for you. I feel that you would just have to get those dates for the record.

Mr. Baron. We can do that.

Would you say that every major operation that you undertook at JMWAVE would have been approved by the Special Group or at least they would have been put on notice of the nature of any major operation that you were planning?

Mr. Halley. Why do you not define for me what you consider to be a major operation so we do not get into, you know, a problem? If you feel that you cannot do that . . .

Mr. Baron. Perhaps we can turn it around and say, could you characterize the kinds of operations generally that you would refer to this three-man group initially, to the Special Group later, for their approval, or at least to put them on notice, the kinds that you might not refer and instead proceed unilaterally?

Mr. Halley. Initially, the three-man group was seized with the problem of conducting the survey of what could be done against Cuba. As soon as that was more or less agreed upon, my understanding of this, as I told you, the three-man group was disbanded or atrophied or went on to other things and then the formal mechanism came in for approval, that is, the Special Group. As procedures became more formalized, we had to submit a monthly schedule of the kind of operations that

would be conducted against Cuba in the paramilitary fields.

In other words, if we were going to run an operation that was going to be a cache replacement in the Cuban mainland, that had to be put in, say in our October schedule, that October schedule had to be submitted to the Washington Headquarters so they could make it available to the Special Group sometime in September. So I would regard a cache, say the lowest kind of operation in terms of sensitivity, and then you could move up from team infiltrations that had to be approved in advance, resupply missions, paramiltary operations against fixed installations would all be approved.

Mr. Baron. If there had been any operation with the assassination of Fidel Castro, or other high Cuban government leaders as its objective, would such an operation have been referred to either the three-man group or later the Special Group.

Mr. Halley. If such an operation had been proposed from Miami, it would have had to have gone through that particular process.

Mr. Baron. Your answer seems to indicate that only operations that originated at the JMWAVE Station would be referred up for approval. Is that correct?

Mr. Halley. That is the kind of activity that I have firsthand knowledge of. When I became the Station Chief, I told you my time at this was essentially February of 1962 through

either June or July of '65. That was my stewardship. That was my involvement in the Cuban operation.

During that particular period of time, my firsthand knowledge of these events would be, if that kind of operation were to go forward it would have had to go through this approval mechanism, it would have had to have been some formal action taken. If it were something that certainly would -- for some reason might not be committed to paper, somebody may have wanted to discuss it orally from Miami, the chain of command would have been from me to whomever was the head of the Task Force in Washington, or later, when the Task Force became reintegrated into the Western Hemisphere Division, I would have had to talk to the Chief of the Western Hemisphere Division, who at one time was FitzGerald.

Mr. Baron. But a plan that originated at the CIA above the level of the Chief of Station at JMWAVE would not necessarily have been referred to Special Group for approval, is that correct?

Mr. Halley. I have no firsthand knowledge of that, therefore I am trying to restrict myself to those things that I have personal knowledge of. In other words, that is the kind of thing that I think you should talk to, you know, those who were involved directly, because I think you can talk to Mr. Harvey or Mr. Screber or others who would be able to give you a better perception of that.

I want to make one point here, that once I went to Miami,

I was a regular visitor to Washington, but always for one or two days at a time when there was always a full agenda of events to be discussed that related to the Station in Miami. I did not carry here, I did not engage, you know, in idle conversation with my associates. Therefore, I was not aware of the firsthand situation of how they conducted business on a sustained basis on items that did not immediately impact on Miami.

Mr. Baron. Do you have any personal knowledge of any operation run out of the JMWAVE Station that could be construed as an assassination effort?

Mr. Halley. No, I do not.

Mr. Baron. Do you have firsthand knowledge of any operation run out of Florida with CIA involvement that could be construed as an assassination effort?

Mr. Halley. No, I do not have any firsthand knowledge. You also have to put this in a historical perspective. In other words, from what I have read in the Press since then, obviously I could put certain things together. You are asking me in this timeframe, 1962 to 1965, did I have any firsthand knowledge at that particular time?

Mr. Baron. Exactly.

Mr. Halley. The answer to that is no, I did not.

You also have to put yourself in the historical context of that particular time. Thousands of refugees were coming out of Cuba, coming into Miami, Dade County up and down the Florida

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Keys. There was a regular mechanism to screen these people. Any number of these people had plans or ideas for changing the situation in Cuba, among those ideas for changing the situation in Cuba were plans to assassinate any number of people in Cuba. This was something that was talked about, you could go down to any coffee house in downtown Miami and Cubans would be talking that kind of language.

So I do not want to leave you with the impression that the word assassination never came across my radar screen, but we are talking about, and my answer was geared to a planned operation by CIA.

Mr. Baron. Or with CIA involvement of any sort?

Mr. Halley. CIA involvement? I know of no operation that was a planned operational activity, you know, for the sole purpose of assassinating, you know, Mr. A, B or Mr. C. This was the ambiente allenteof the time. People were talking about these things in the refugee community, these kind of things were being discussed.

Mr. Baron. Mr. A, B or C could have been Fidel Castro, Raul Castro?

Mr. Halley. It could have been anyone. This was the mood of the Latin American revolutionary where a coup, you know, is a way of life, where restaurants and coffee houses abound with conversation about how to run a coup. In the running of a coup, one of the things that people talk about is how do you control

the leadership which then exists at that time.

Mr. Baron. Are you saying that you are not aware of any operation which could have had as one of its subsidiary objectives, whether the primary objective or not, the assassination of Fidel Castro, Raul Castro, or Che Guevara, which was run with CIA involvement?

Mr. Halley. I would like to phrase that question slightly differently, because I think, you know, you have several things tied together. I would like to answer your question this way.

During my tenure in Miami, I did not put forth any proposals to mount an assassination operation. In other words, there was no formal plan, I did not put forth any operational proposals along this line.

Secondly, I am not aware of any assassination plans being put forth, you know, by Mr. Harvey or by anyone else at that particular time. That is the way I would prefer to answer that.

Mr. Baron. What kind of problem did you have with the question as it was asked?

Mr. Halley. Well, you lumped a number of things together. I am trying to separate these out. In other words, you put in there a secondary or tertiary consideration.

Mr. Baron. Right, I am interested in that.

Mr. Halley. That is what bothers me, because I did not put forth any plans. On the other hand, I do not want to be held responsible for such things as CIA being in touch with a

paramilitary group in Cuba whose primary mission was the collection of intelligence, whose secondary mission might be to organize a resistance and, unbeknownst to me, might have had their own ideas which were never consulted with us, you know, never discussed with us, through the communications channels that we had, who may have been thinking, may have planned, and may have attempted, to implement assassination operations.

I do not feel under the command and control mechanism that existed that I could exercise through the Station over such a situation that I could be held responsible for that. Therefore, I cannot accept your question on the secondary or tertiary situation because I have no knowledge of those. You may have some knowledge and you can confront me with some statement by some Cuban who said that this was part of his mission. I have to look at that at the time.

Mr. Baron. We will go over some statements, but in trying to recover this ground one more time, I think it is important to distinguish an attempt to pin the responsibility on you, which I am not trying to do by my questioning --

Mr. Halley. That is a complicated question.

Mr. Baron. The attempt to simply -- undoubtedly, the attempt to simply bring out your knowledge and any awareness that you may have had of any kind of operation that had assassination as one of its objectives, and also involved the CIA to any extent. That is what I am asking you for.

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Mr. Halley. Right, and I will stand by my answer, that is, I put forth no plans, I know of no plans put forth, you know, during my tenure in Miami in which assassination was part of the operational rationale. You know, the only way we can clarify this perhaps to your satisfaction is to discuss some specifics. If you are prepared to talk about specifics, maybe I can deal with those within the framework of that general statement that I made, you know. I know how Cubans talk. I know the rumors that have existed over the years. I simply do not want to be identified with any action conducted by some group over which I had no knowledge or control. That is my key point.

Mr. Baron. I think that answers it for now, and we will cover some specifics later.

One more question on this dual chain of command: on the one hand, the Agency chain of command from the DDP to Harvey to you at JMWAVE, and on the other hand, the three-man decision making group consisting of the Attorney General, Lansdale and Helms. Would you say in the early days that this three-man group appeared to you to be in control of the decision making before the Special Group stepped in, that decisions were made in a less formal way than they were later under the Special Group?

Mr. Halley. I really could not address myself to that. In other words, I never sat in on a meeting of the three-man group. In other words --

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Mr. Baron. What about the kind of reporting that was required of you by the three-man group as opposed to the Special Group?

Mr. Halley. My requirements for reporting really stemmed in the early days from Harvey. If there were any special requirements, he was taking them from the three-man group and translating them and, in fact, much of the system of reporting in those early days was generated by me and what I thought was required to keep Mr. Harvey as a Task Force Commander fully informed. I think that you undoubtedly know from the record that I worked for Mr. Harvey prior to 1962 and therefore I was familiar, you know, with his style of operation and thought I had a clear understanding of what he needed in an informational sense. So when I went to Miami, I organized much of the reporting flow upward, if you will, from the field unit to Headquarters.

Mr. Baron. Had you worked for Mr. Harvey in Germany?

Mr. Halley. Yes, I had.

Mr. Baron. In Berlin?

Mr. Halley. Yes, sir.

Mr. Baron. This was on the famous and successful tunnel operation?

Mr. Halley. No, I do not deserve any credit for the tunnel operation. That is Mr. Harvey's activity. He kept that very tightly compartmented and in the days when that was going on, I

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was involved primarily with Eastern European activities.

Mr. Baron. You were aware of Mr. Harvey's style of operating?

Mr. Halley. Yes. I worked with him -- I think the date is somewhere in June or July of '54 to somewhere in '59. I would have to look that up in the record, the exact date.

Mr. Baron. But you say you not only had a close working relationship with Mr. Harvey, but you came to be a personal friend of his?

Mr. Halley. Yes, I would like to say I am a personal friend of Mr. Harvey.

Mr. Baron. Returning to your statements about the chain of command, you seem to be saying that Mr. Harvey served as the funnel for both of these chains of command; as far as you were concerned, you received directives from him, whatever the source may have been originally, is that correct?

Mr. Halley. Correct.

I want to make a point. Insofar as the three-man group was concerned, I would see Helms in his role as the DDP in the three-man group. I would see Lansdale -- as I told you, Lansdale came down to visit me in Miami on one occasion. He came as part of that three-man group. But my chain of command, during my visit was still from me to Harvey. Lansdale was down there, I was to be, you know, straightforward, candid, discuss plans, programs, problems. But I received my orders and instructions

the control of money and so forth was vested in the Task Force Commander, Mr. Harvey.

Therefore, I never dealt with this three-man group as a body. I dealt with the individuals, you know, and various mutations.

Mr. Baron. Would you say that the three-man group had a less formal, more free-wheeling style of decision making, and there was a real change in the rigor with which you were required to report after the Special Group took over?

Mr. Halley. I would have to say that the total reporting became more formalized the longer we stayed in business. I cannot ascribe this to the difference of style of the three-man group as opposed to the Agency chain of command or subsequent with the requirements of the Special Group. This evolved from a body of experience that was gained as the operation was established and got some experience.

So I would not want to characterize that as being a result of the groups.

Mr. Baron. You did not have any problem with the propriety of the three-man group in the early stages?

Mr. Halley. No, I had no reason to believe that it was not a duly constituted body. In other words, the officers that I reported to, in that particular case, Mr. Harvey, Mr. Helms, were my chain of command at that particular point, were the ones who briefed me on the existence of this three-man body

and I felt that that was a perfectly legitimate function of that body.

Mr. Baron. Who briefed you on the existence of the body?

Mr. Halley. My recollection of the initial briefing was from Mr. Harvey.

Mr. Baron. Do you recall how he described that three-man group and the responsibilities?

Mr. Halley. No. This was 1962, and this is 1975. As you know from my records, these intervening years have been very active for me, therefore, I do not remember with precision that conversation in all of its details. I do recall my first briefing on the existence of this three-man group being from Harvey.

Mr. Baron. You mentioned that General Lansdale might occasionally meet with you personally. This is in Miami, at JMWAVE Station?

Mr. Halley. I can only recall at this point one specific meeting where he came down to Florida in Miami to visit.

Mr. Baron. What was the substance of that meeting?

Mr. Halley. He was given some briefings by my staff on their areas of specialization, whether it was foreign intelligence collection, whether it was maritime activities, or whether it was paramilitary activities. I spent a lot of time with him personally, talking about where we stood, where we were making progress in the collection of intelligence, where we were having

problems, and so on. It was a substantive management operation, problem-oriented type of conversation.

Mr. Baronv. What period of time would you place this in?

Mr. Halley. Probably sometime in the summer of '62, because my family was already in Miami at that point, and when I first went to Miami my family was not with me. I think my wife joined me in Miami sometime in the summer of '62, you know, I would have to research that. It is obviously available from the records as to when my family moved and a permanent change of station.

Mr. Baron. Was there any discussion whether direct or indirect of assassination of Cuban leaders during your meetings with General Lansdale?

Mr. Halley. I do not recall any such conversations. You know, I think that from my point of view, we are off a little bit on this perspective. I would like to try to focus on the perspective for you in the historical setting.

Mr. Baron. Please do.

Mr. Halley. I think by your questions and your interest, you are narrowly focused on this assassination thing, but let me turn that around a bit, and let me put it in my context at the time which may help you understand my answers.

Mr. Baron. Before you do, can I stop you for one moment? I would like to get back on the track that we originally started on of asking you about the JMWAVE Station in general

and the context at that time. Could I ask just a couple of specific questions before we do that, about the three-man group that you raised, and then give you a full opportunity to ~~pull~~ put ~~out of~~ what we have said so far and everything that will follow into context.

Did you have any individual meetings with Robert Kennedy, who was then-Attorney General?

Mr. Halley. You mean individual, one on one?

Are you saying did I have a meeting, a personal, private meeting with the Attorney General?

Mr. Baron. Yes.

Mr. Halley. The answer to that is no.

Mr. Baron. Did you have any meetings with the Attorney General of any sort during this period of time?

Mr. Halley. I mentioned to you earlier that at this meeting that I went to with Director McCone, the Attorney General, Mr. Robert Kennedy, was present at that White House briefing. He did ask some questions, which I do not remember what the questions were at this particular point in time. I answered some of those questions that were put during the course of that particular presentation. Throughout that whole period of time, that was the only, if you will, direct contact with him that I can remember. You know, unless you can show me something.

Mr. Baron. During the entire period that you were involved with JMWAVE?

Mr. Halley. That is right.

Mr. Baron. At that meeting -- again, I realize what we are doing is in isolation, out of context -- at that meeting that you attended, with the Cabinet members and the President, was there any discussion either directly or indirectly or by means of any circumlocutions of the subject of assassination?

Mr. Halley. Not that I can recall.

You know, my recollection of that meeting is, we went to it en masse, the first -- you know, Director McCone, myself, Bruce Cheever, several other people who went. We went in several cars. We went to the meeting, the Cuban issue was the first item on the agenda. As I recall the thing, the Cuban thing was over after this period of time. We, the technocrats left, the Director John McCone stayed on. You know, during my presence at the meeting there was nothing discussed about assassinations.

Mr. Baron. Was there any such discussion between yourself and John McCone or Richard Helms at any point?

Mr. Halley. I never recall discussing assassinations with John McCone. Now, in terms of discussions with Richard Helms, these were conversations in which atmospherics in Miami and problems like that would be discussed, and I am sure somewhere in some of these conversations the mood of the community, the subject of assassinations undoubtedly came up. This was part of the life of that particular period.

I cannot remember a specific date, you know, some time at which that was discussed, and you know I never received any instruction from Helms to mount an assassination operation.

Mr. Baron. Again, I am not trying to unfairly pull these kinds of conversations out of their historical context. Before we flesh out the historical context, do you have any recollection of the manner in which assassination might have come up between yourself and Helms?

Mr. Halley. Again, I put it in this overall context of the times. We were running Foreign intelligence collection operations against Cuba with classical agent means. We were running collection against Cuba through paramilitary teams. We were involved in paramilitary operations that could be described as commando raids. Those were the kinds of activities.

We were dealing with exile groups, we were debriefing refugees and in all of this conversations of assassination, the Cuban penchant for it had to come up. I cannot pinpoint --

Mr. Baron. You do not recall any reference of means to be used or people to be involved?

Mr. Halley. No. Even such things as discussions of various kinds of weapons, you know, people, as you probably know from this experience, every individual who deals with weapons has a different view on what is the ideal weapon. If you took a squad of ten men and gave them the free choice, I am sure all ten of them would come up with a different weapon.

Therefore, when we were standardizing weapons to our paramilitary teams, things like that, weapons would be discussed in terms of, you know, muzzle velocity, rate of fire, weight of the weapon for the Cuban to carry, because many of them were quite small. In this context, people would discuss what is the range, can a guy use it to shoot somebody at a particular range? Is this an assassination weapon? Is this a good weapon for close combat?

Therefore the term assassination was just a part of the life, of the fabric at that time. That is what I am trying to get across. I just cannot articulate any more eloquently than that.

Mr. Baron. I think you are being quite eloquent and extremely informative. You mentioned that the phrase assassination would be used in the discussions about the kinds of weapons that would be used for commando raids or equipping your operatives.

Mr. Halley. Paramilitary teams, right.

Mr. Baron. Was the capacity of a weapon to be used as an assassination weapon among other uses a desirable capacity?

In other words, was that phrase used positively?

Mr. Halley. No, it was not. It is the kind of thing that weaves itself into, you know, a conversation.

For instance, if you are planning a commando raid against something like an oil refinery, you have to think about how are

you going to get across the guard force that is around a refinery? One of the questions you have, of course, is if you bypass them, you are successful to get in without a trail or any kind of a struggle, that is great. But what happens if you are implanting your target and the guard stumbles on you, you know, the guard force then becomes an immediate risk to your operation and usually there is a fire fight. Therefore, this becomes a question of weapons. In other words, what weapon is going to give the highest muzzle velocity and make the largest amount of noise. Therefore, if you have two weapons of co-equal cyclic rate of fire and one made less rate of noise than the other for that job you would pick the weapon with the lowest noise. You might even silence it. You may make a silenced submachine gune out of it.

These are the kinds of things that go into these discussions of weapons.

Mr. Baron. The technology of assassination and targetted shooting, are you referring to -- when you say assassination weapon -- to a weapon generally capable of targetted shooting?

Mr. Halley. In this particular context, I think most people felt that the Cuban penchant for assassination, for discussing assassination, was the kind that would have to be done from a long range.

You know, I think that it is generally an accepted thesis that a group of dedicated men who are prepared to give their lives

can in time assassinate almost anybody. Now, the Cuban was not that kind of a person. That was not his psychological make-up. He tends to want to live, to enjoy life, to talk about his accomplishment. Therefore, while they were brave and dedicated, they were the kind of people who would probably engage in something like this in the context of using the sniper weapon as a vehicle for assassination, long distance.

Therefore, in this context you are talking about range, you know, one of the key factors becomes what is the accurate range of a weapon if fired by an expert marksman. Therefore, that is the kind of thing that would go into, you know, discussions of weapons.

Mr. Baron. When you were discussing weapons with high range and low muzzle velocity, was this ever discussed in the context of shooting Fidel Castro or other key Cuban leaders as opposed to targetted shooting on a commando raid.

Mr. Halley. I can recall, you know, no conversation in which it was narrowly focused on the question of Fidel Castro.

Mr. Baron. Let us go back, then, to putting this all into historical context. I am going to ask you if you can explain more about the structure of the JMWAVE Station, both the channels upward from you to the Agency and the Special Group and the channels downward from you to your operatives, if in the course of explaining the structure, you would like to make some comments about the historical context, that would be

appreciated.

Mr. Halley. I think what I would like to do is to try to put this into some perspective.

The perspective really starts with the failure of the Bay of Pigs Operation. After the failure of the Bay of Pigs, the Kennedy Administration wanted another look taken at the problem of Cuba. In order to get that other look started, the Kennedy Administration created this three-man task force or this three-man group and wanted to see what else could be done against Cuba, and that is when I came into this problem in February of '62.

Mr. Baron. Is it possible that the three-man group that you are referring to is actually the Robert Kennedy-Maxwell Taylor Board of Inquiry into the reasons for the failure of the Bay of Pigs operation?

Mr. Halley. This three-man group stemmed out of that inquiry. What its relationship was to the inquiry, I do not know, because I was not involved and I never had an opportunity once I plunged into this job, to go back and read those historical documents. You know, I am sure there is a Maxwell Taylor Report, and so forth, but I have never read it.

All right.

Therefore, my first task when I became involved in this was the task of coming up with an operational plan to see what kinds of intelligence could be collected in Cuba, so that by

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collecting this intelligence, an assessment could be made based on hard facts as to what could be done against Castro. In other words, the difference here was that people thought that the Bay of Pigs operation was not soundly grounded in intelligence. Therefore, this was an attempt to start the collection of intelligence to see what could be done.

In order to collect intelligence at that particular time, it was believed that all avenues of approach should be used, so that meant classical foreign intelligence operations, counterintelligence operations, the debriefing of refugees, and the use of paramilitary means to put teams into Cuba to collect intelligence on that part of the island that could not be covered by what you would call the more classical means of foreign intelligence collection.

As the program was started essentially by me or accelerated by me, we in fact got caught up with the Cuban Missile Crisis -- that is, the advent of the Soviet intervention into Cuba -- and our whole effort shifted to covering that Soviet build-up in Cuba, and this was an integral part to our having detected the Soviet build-up and the United States government taking the actions which they did, that is, to verify this.

There was a great problem for a while when we were all talking about hard intelligence, the President, John Kennedy, was telling us, give us hard intelligence. We thought we were giving him hard intelligence. What he meant, in his definition

of hard intelligence, as it turned out to be, was a U-2 photograph. He never articulated that to us in those terms.

Then we got caught up into the eyball to eyeball confrontation of the Cuban Missile Crisis. When that was over, we got caught up with the problem of monitoring the disengagement of the Soviet presence in Cuba. That took us up through sometime into early '63.

Then we took a look again, because we knew an awful lot more about them than we had when we started in February of '62, to see what could be done against Cuba, and it was clear at that point that no external invasion was going to be possible, because that was something that was excluded by the Khruschev-Kennedy agreement and then it was not feasible. In any event, therefore it was a question of what could be done. So we were collecting intelligence to continue to stay on top of the situation. We were attempting to establish contacts with the military establishment in Cuba to see if there was any force that was opposed to Castro within the military establishment that would be used to alter the situation and continue to see whether there were any economic pressures that could be brought on Cuba that would accelerate the whole problem of creating an environment in which a resistance could be created on an island.

Mr. Baron. Were those the two primary tactics used at that point when Castro had consolidated his strength and

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when the United States and Russia reached an agreement that no external invasion of Cuba would take place, did you turn primarily to the ways and means of finding a dissident group within Cuba that might be capable of overthrowing Castro, number one, and number two, of finding means of undermining the economic strength of the Castro government.

Mr. Halley. In addition, we were continuing to support certain elements of resistance, you know, that were still there that were not in the Army.

Mr. Baron. What kinds of elements were those?

Mr. Halley. These were paramilitary forces that were in Cuba, that we had put in or established contact with, or people who were already in the bush who we had already established contact with or they had established contact with us, and we were providing them with food, weapons and so forth so that they could survive. So that it was a multifaceted approach at that particular time.

That went on from the middle of '63 until the middle of '65, and these are two distinct phases of this operation. In effect, one, a survey, and two, the Missile Crisis and its post-mortem, and then the next phase was the continuation of intelligence collection, the working or taking the sounding with military dissidents, economic pressure, and working with natural dissident elements that were still on the island.

I think you know that all of your questions have to be put

into these various timeframes. When you talk about, was there ever a discussion of assassination, you know, when people were coming out and being interviewed, yes, some Cuban refugee would say, by God, I would like to go back and shoot, you know, X, Y or Z. It might have been some commandante in his particular area; it could have been Fidel Castro. This was just part of the fabric of the times.

Mr. Baron. Can we turn now to the structure of the JMWAVE Station and explain that a bit? How large was the Station? What was the command structure within the Station?

Mr. Halley. The Station started expanding in whatever timeframe it was, somewhere after the survey was completed. It must have started expanding sometime in March of 1962. You know, by the time that it was at its peak, which was probably somewhere just before the Cuban Missile Crisis, July, August of 1962, it was either the largest or the second largest -- my recollection was that it was the second largest station in existence at that time. I would not want to be pinned down on a particular number of people on any particular day.

Mr. Baron. Could you give some idea as to the number of employees at the Station during its peak?

Mr. Halley. I would say somewhere in the neighbordhood of, you know, [redacted] You know, again, this means staff and contract employees.

Mr. Baron. What do you cover with the term contract

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employees?

Mr. Halley. These would be, for instance, maritime case officers. We hired people who had specialized skills, that is, that they could manage a series of vessels for us, but they were not longterm staff employees. These would be people who would be used, if you will, in a management organization, basic implementation of the program.

Mr. Baron. Did you have other agents or operatives among the Cuban community or outside the Cuban community that were affiliated with the Station although not employed by it directly?

Mr. Halley. I think we are going to have to define some terms.

Mr. Baron. What I am trying to do now is simply get a picture of the scope of the Station's strength and ~~in~~ its activities, how many people the Station had to call upon for its activities.

Mr. Halley. Well, let me try to give you an answer, because I think we are going to get into a semantic problem here.

When I talk about the Station, as such, I would say that is roughly in the neighborhood of [three hundred] people, and that was those people who would be involved in the management effort, the direction effort, the financial logistics, cover procedures, security, that kind of thing. All right? Flowing out from that were people whom we would call agents, that is, 21

people who were not knowledgeable necessarily of whom they worked for or where the cover offices were located and so forth. Let us say, in the maritime part of the operation we might have had at any one point in time, you know, up to five hundred people involved in maritime activities, you know?

Again, if you pick a date, I am sure we can research it. The records are still available and you know how many people we had, but let us take these five hundred. What am I talking about? These would be essentially Cubans who were the captains of the vessles that were used in infiltration operations to put people on the shore of Cuba, and there were a variety of techniques. In other words, you might start on with the mother ship, which would be an LCI -- I am not sure how familiar you are with various kinds of vessels.

Mr. Baron. What is an LCI?

Mr. Halley. Landing craft kind of vessle, or a patrol craft, a PC, 110-foot vessle, that would be a mother ship. This is the kind of ship that would take fuel supplies and water, so that other smaller vessels could be serviced by it. So you might start with an operation of a mother ship towing a smaller boat, or having it on its decks and going down to fifteen or twenty miles from Cuba, putting the smaller boat over the side, which was a faster boat, lower silhouette, less likely to be picked up by Cuban coastal radar, and then that would take the team in close to the shore where we might finally

put them into rubber rafts, where they would paddle in or use a silent outboard motor if the surf was high.

Mr. Baron. The people involved in manning those crafts would not necessarily be employees of the Station directly? They might be agents, even non-paid agents?

Mr. Halley. No, they were not paid. For instance, they might work for a particular cover company. In other words, I am only using this as an example. Let us say we had the ABC Shipping Company. That shipping company was a subsidiary of the Station, if you will, and the ABC Shipping Company ran maybe one LCI and maybe two or three smaller boats which it could deck load and that company might have fifty or seventy-five employees, as an example, all Cubans, maybe some of them was Nicaraguans or Costa Ricans as most of these vessels -- I would have to go and look at each vessel.

Does that give you a feel for the size of the problem?

Mr. Baron. How many such companies would have been in existence at that time, companies operating as CIA proprietaries or companies in cover and supplying the JMWAVE Station with personnel or with equipment?

Mr. Halley. We are talking about all of these companies, they probably went up into the hundreds. I distinguish between companies that were set up simply to provide cover as opposed to companies that were proprietaries. You know, these terms mean different things to me. The nature of the Agency's

involvement in each is different. I am having a little trouble --

Mr. Baron. Could you explain what different categories of companies you were receiving help from at that point, and about how many of each there might have been?

Mr. Halley. I do not think I could do that. We are talking about hundreds of companies that we used during that period of time. Some of them might simply have been a company set up and registered and run out of some attorney's office. It simply provided back stopping for the ownership of the small boat.

Everything has to be owned by somebody, it has to have a Coast Guard registration, you know, things like that. Even if I had access to the files to answer your question, it would take me weeks to pull all that together to give you an answer. I don't think there is an overview statement.

Mr. Baron. Would it be fair to say that you had cooperation on a grand scale from all kinds of people in private enterprise in the Miami area, or in Southern Florida?

Mr. Halley. I think it would be fair to say that we had extensive cooperation — I do not like your word "grand" -- that we had extensive cooperation from the civilian sector in Florida, in the state of Florida, to facilitate the conduct of this clandestine mission.

Mr. Baron. Did you also have extensive cooperation from

civic officials and law enforcement agencies in being allowed to operate free or the law? For instance, were you allowed to put vessels onto the water which were not properly registered, or which could be held immune for inspection by the Coast Guard or other maritime authorities, and were you allowed to send people through the streets of Southern Florida who may have been armed or violating local law in some other way, who were held immune by arrangements that you had with law enforcement agencies?

Mr. Halley. You have asked me, in essence, three questions.

Mr. Baron. Right.

Mr. Halley. Let me try to divide that and deal with each question separately.

Let me first deal with the vessels. Every vessel that we had was appropriately registered. There were no short-cuts insofar as the U.S. Coast Guard was concerned. That is, any vessel that was registered in the United States met appropriate safety standards and so forth, so we were not putting any vessels into the water that any citizen could not have put into the water. That is we are talking about ten, fifteen, twenty foot boats, thirty foot boats, thirty-five foot boats, things like that. These boats were owned in either a corporate name or by a private individual who had to register them with the Coast Guard and pass normal Coast Guard regulations.

(Discussion off the record.)

Mr. Baron. To continue with this, I understand that safety regulations would have been complied with, but was there some sort of immunity from inspection, say inspection for carrying armaments aboard a vessel that the CIA had arranged with maritime authorities, or local law enforcement authorities?

Mr. Halley. When we had operations going, these were coordinated with the Coast Guard in terms of their knowing that, you know, at a particular date, time group, that there would be a rendezvous between two vessels which were our vessels, and this was coordinated with the Coast Guard.

Mr. Baron. Would you return to the second part of that large question? Without reference to vessels, were CIA employees or agents on the streets of cities in Southern Florida immune from search or arrest by local law enforcement authorities?

Mr. Halley. They were not immune.

Let me ask to dispel one myth that I think has developed which is reflected in your question. We were meticulous to insure that no weapons were issued to anybody until the men were on the vessel outside of the immediate waters of south Florida, and we were meticulous to insure that when they came back from a mission that they were met at sea and all the weapons were taken away from them.

So, when you talk about a group moving around in Florida,

we did work out through the entire state, and I did not want you to feel that I was being less than candid with you, and you keep saying south Florida, I want to say to you that we operated in the state of Florida, men moving around armed under our control in the state of Florida, is just not correct. This was all carefully controlled and they did not have their weapons when they came back, we took them before they landed, so they were not immune.

Mr. Baron. You did have general arrangements or agreements with law enforcement agencies throughout Florida for the treatment of CIA operatives who were affiliated with the JMWAVE Station?

Mr. Halley. We did have, through our Office of Security, a continuing dialogue with a number of law enforcement agencies in Florida. If a problem developed, we would then contact them and look at the issue within the context of what had transpired. Certainly there was no immunity. In other words, this has to be looked at on a case by case basis.

For instance, you know, we had a training site in north Florida, as an example. If somebody came off of that site that was drunk and disorderly in town and could not speak English, the local authorities did have a number to call to raise this with us to see whether this was somebody that was of interest to us, and then we would have to go and settle that particular case.

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Mr. Baron. Back to the structure of the relationships between yourself as Chief of Station at JMWAVE and any operatives or employees who worked underneath you at that Station, would it be fair to say that any activities run out of the Station ultimately were channeled out through you?

Mr. Halley. They should have been, and they were -- you know this Station went through several mutations in organization during its existence. I guess the organizational structure that existed for the longest period of time was something like I am going to describe to you.

There was a Chief of Station, which was myself. I had a Deputy Chief of Station for operations. That is the gentleman who is now retired, I think he is still alive, by the name of Moore, Robert Moore. I had a second Deputy Chief of Station and he was for Support Patterns. That is a gentleman who is also retired, a Mr. Corris.

Then the rest of the Station was organized into a number of branches. Each branch was organized along functional lines. Let me give you an example. There was a Foreign Intelligence Branch. These were people in, what in my terminology would be classical foreign intelligence operations. That is, trying to recruit a Cuban diplomat abroad, as an example, dealing with, you know, a Uruguayan diplomat in the Uruguayan Embassy in Havana. They are working with resident agents in Cuba who might live in some city like Havana and have a legal job as a baker or

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butcher or something but had a radio set in which they could communicate with us, through which they could communicate to us.

Then there was the Paramilitary Branch. This was the group that ran the commando operations. This was the group that ran, and put people back into Cuba, into resistance groups, or established contact with resistance groups. This was a group that also worked in putting in caches that would supply people, either paramilitary forces in Cuba or agents that were being run by the Foreign Intelligence Group.

All right. Then there was a Covert Action, people who dealt with exiled refugee groups that were involved in radio activities, publications, that kind of thing. Then there is a whole panoply of -- then there was Maritime, in terms of finance, and so on. Security was a branch. Obviously, under that kind of system, no executive, whether he is president of a corporation or a Station Chief, can see every single piece of paper that comes in or out, but clearly there was a review procedure whereby program reviews were conducted, individual operational reviews were conducted.

Mr. Baron. By yourself?

Mr. Halley. By myself. I do not want to leave you with the impression that I knew every single thing that was going on every minute and could account for the activities of three hundred employees on a daily basis.

Mr. Baron. In talking about the personnel affiliated

with the Station a moment ago, I think we may have created a misimpression that the only people involved in CIA operations were people who were paid by the Agency. Isn't it also true that there were many members of Cuban exile groups in Florida who participated voluntarily from time to time in CIA sponsored operations?

Mr. Halley. I think that you may have to sharpen that up for me. I am not sure what you really mean.

If you are talking about foreign intelligence collections, you know, the people who were producing --

Mr. Baron. I am talking now about the paramilitary operations.

Mr. Halley. No. I do not know of any people that were involved in paramilitary operations that were not in some way paid.

Mr. Baron. By the Agency?

Mr. Halley. By the Agency.

Let me make sure that we understand each other, because during this period of time there were a lot of independent Cuban groups who claimed that they had sponsorship from the Agency but did not, and were operating, and there was a period in time when these groups could not run their operations from Florida without running the risk of being picked up by Customs, Immigration, Coast Guard, the FBI, or if we had information on it, you know, we might pass the information to the Coast Guard

so that they could keep them from going.

If that is what you are referring to, somebody like Alpha 66 or Commando L or somebody like that, they were not a part of the CIA apparatus.

Mr. Baron. Although you might be aware of their activities?

Mr. Halley. We would be aware of their activities, certainly.

Mr. Baron. Can you explain if there is anything to add to what we have already said? The chain of command, apart from yourself as Chief of Station, to Task Force W and to the Directorate of Plans within the Agency?

You would report directly to William Harvey?

Mr. Halley. William Harvey was Chief of Task Force W, later FitzGerald. My chain of command was from me to them. You know, they had a subordinate staff who helped them monitor the Station's activity, so that it just was not the fact, you know, that Mr. Harvey and Mr. FitzGerald were totally dependent on what I told them. To have an appreciation of what was going on in Miami they had their own staff that was following individual operations.

For instance, they had a paramilitary staff that would review our proposals for a paramilitary operation and might say we think that the Station has overextended itself this month, they want to run twenty-five operations given the weather during this particular month of October. We do not

think they could do it. We think they should be guided to run only twenty, fifteen, something like that. So they were not totally dependent on me.

Mr. Baron. What was the nature of the split of responsibility between Task Force W and JMWAVE Station?

In other words, were there certain operations that were run directly out of Task Force W?

Mr. Halley. Also, you have to put this into a historical time. What period are you talking about?

Mr. Baron. During the period of your tenure. If there were changes during your tenure at JMWAVE, why do you not explain those?

Mr. Halley. There were. Each one is different. Let me give you a couple of examples.

Washington, Task Force W, essentially did not run any paramilitary operations where they took command and control for sending people to Cuba. For instance, if Task Force W in Washington wanted to plant a radio in Cuba which was to be picked up by foreign intelligence agents who could report, they would task us to implant that radio in a cache in a particular area in Cuba, for instance, Oriente province. We would know simply that it was a radio perhaps. We would then put it into Oriente province, write up the site, give them the rip cord. They would communicate to the agents in Cuba who would go recover the cache.

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So they had agents in Cuba that were reporting foreign intelligence to them so they had collection assets that were reporting to them along the same lines that we did. They did work at a downstream point when FitzGerald came in with a couple of groups -- in other words, they had contact with Artime. I had no contact with the Artime group as a general rule. They also had contact with Manolo Ray which I did not have contact with. So they were working with these kinds of larger exile groups.

The Task Force also specialized in much more economic activity than I did. That is a question of looking at such things as [redacted] bus exports from [redacted] to Cuba. 13,13

Mr. Baron. In terms of paramilitary operations, if an assassination operation had been run by Task Force W, would you have assumed as Chief of Station in Miami you would have been aware of such an operation?

Mr. Halley. No, I do not assume that.

Mr. Baron. Would it not have been sound managerial practice to let you know that there was an operation that might have been run through Florida into Cuba?

Mr. Halley. No.

You know, the Agency is a highly compartmented mechanism. You know, let us dispel one thing very promptly here. If you are asking me was I aware of all these contacts, you know, with the Mafia -- and I think I can tell you frankly at that time I

was not -- Harvey would come, you know, to Miami, to visit me to review the activities of the station, and while there would go off on his own and make his contact with whomever he was meeting. I knew he was meeting somebody, but it was not up to me to find out with whom he was meeting or why he was meeting them or what he was doing with them.

Mr. Baron. My question really was, I think more innocent than that.

Was it strictly one of involving what correct management techniques would be, or what kind of knowledge the Chief of Station of JMWAVE would have to have in order to do an effective job in dealing with the Cuban community and running operations into Cuba? You seem to be saying that it would not be necessary to run an effective job to have knowledge of every other operation that the CIA is running against Castro?

Mr. Halley. I think what I am saying during that particular time -- I do not want you to come to the conclusion that I was knowledgeable of everything that ran in from or through the state of Florida, because during that period of time, for instance, Mr. Harvey in particular was a very compartmented gentleman, and it would be keeping with his style to run an operation in which the locus of the operation might be Florida and I would not know about it.

Now, that would be an unusual thing, but it is not precluded.

Mr. Baron. Let us turn for a moment to following up on the

nature of your contacts with William Harvey in reference to any operations he may have in running unilaterally against Castro. Do you recall aiding Harvey in an operation that he was in charge of and that was not affiliated with JMWAVE?

Mr. Halley. I do not recall anything, I do not recall anything specific. In other words, the pattern was in terms of command and control, I would come to Washington on a regular basis to review activity with Harvey after we submitted our paperwork. Harvey was also a frequent visitor to Florida.

We would have operational discussions. He would talk to the Branch Chiefs, he talked to people. He also went out on his own, and he was meeting somebody, it was clear to me that he was meeting people. But it was frankly in the way that the Agency is run and managed, it was not a concern to me whom he was meeting.

Mr. Baron. Would it have been proper of you to inquire of him whom he was meeting?

Mr. Halley. No, it would not have been.

Mr. Baron. Did you have suspicions or speculation about whom he might have been meeting or for what purpose that he was having these meetings?

Mr. Halley. No, not for what purpose. There is a whole, you know, panoply of things going on at that time. You know, frankly I was a very busy guy; when Harvey was there, it occupied one hunk of a lot of my time. If he wanted to go off, you know,

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do something else and was going to meet someone else, that was fine with me. It enabled me to get back to my immediate and more pressing problems.

In this business you just do not ask your superior, what are you doing? That is just not cricket; that is not the way the game is played.

tape 4

Mr. Baron. Do you recall a time when Harvey asked you to procure arms and equipment to be passed to a Cuban exile?

Mr. Halley. To a Cuban exile?

Mr. Baron. Let me strike the reference to a Cuban exile.

Do you recall a time when Harvey asked your aid in procuring arms and equipment to be given to a man named Tony Varona who was a contact of Harvey's?

Mr. Halley. I know Tony Varona. He was in the period -- prior to the Bay of Pigs, he was part of the consejo.

Frankly, if you've got something that you can sharpen that up, I think you need some basis, that I think that can trigger my memory here. I do not remember frankly Tony Varona being in Harvey's --

Mr. Baron. In contact with Harvey?

Mr. Halley. You know, I may have procured something for Harvey, some kind of equipment or done some kind of operational support task.

Mr. Baron. Let us make it more specific.

Do you recall helping Harvey load a U-Haul trailer full of

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about $5,000 worth of arms and equipment to be left in a parking lot and picked up there by a contact of Harvey's? And this would be in approximately April of 1962.

Mr. Halley. I do vaguely remember something about a rented truck. Quite frankly, I do not really recall all the details of this at this particular time. I do not remember, you know, personally procuring any material, but it is conceivable that I did get a request from Harvey, that I did go to the logistics apparatus, and whatever he had requested from official stocks he was provided.

Mr. Baron. During that same period of time --

Mr. Halley. I do recall something about a truck. I do not recall anything about a trailer. My recollection of this truck incident seems to be -- I do not remember what it was. We did do something for him logistically, I do remember a truck being involved with some logistic material in terms of a parking lot. But frankly that is about all I can recall of it at this particular time.

Mr. Baron. Do you have any recollection of hearing of poison pills in any connection during your tenure at JMWAVE?

Mr. Halley. No, I do not recall -- poison pills? Poison pills, the only kind of thing I can recall occasionally when people were talking about being on mother ships, you know, what would happen if they were captured. This was a discussion occasionally of whether any kind of drugs should be issued to

the people who were manning these vessels so they could do themselves in if they were to be captured, things like that, but we never issued any such pills but there were discussions of that kind of a problem. I do recall specific agents who were sent back to Cuba to run a collection or to go back into the bush and so forth who asked for some sort of pills which they could kill themselves with if they were captured.

But other than that -- if that is what you were referring to, I think they are called L pills, or something, as they were referred to in those days.

Mr. Baron. Why were they called L pills?

Mr. Halley. Everything has a number or nomenclature, I do not know.

Mr. Baron. Did you ever hear of poison pills to be used in assassination operations against Fidel Castro or other Cuban leaders?

Mr. Halley. No.

Is that referencing to this material that I might have provided for Harvey? Because if that is the case, I can dispel that quickly, because I would not have had access to them.

Mr. Baron. You would not have access to poison pills?

Mr. Halley. No, I would not have access to them.

Mr. Baron. Why not?

Mr. Halley. I did not have them in my inventory. That is not anything that I have, you know, command and control of. That

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is why --

Mr. Baron. They would have had to come directly from Technical Services Division at CIA?

Mr. Halley. That is what I'm trying to clarify what it is that you are trying to establish from me.

In other words, if you are saying --

Mr. Baron. Let us move further, I think we can be more specific now.

We have a document that I am about to show you. I just wanted to clear up the background of it before we discussed the document.

Mr. Halley. Let me just make this point. If you are talking about drug pills, I had no source of such things, so if that is the nature of your question, I can say I had nothing to do with that. If you are talking about, you know --

Mr. Baron. Arms and equipment --

Mr. Halley. -- weapons or something, yes, that was in my inventory. I could have issued that to Harvey, you know, guns, ammunition, plastics, that kind of thing I could have had access to, yes. That is why I am trying to sort out really where the thrust of your questioning is.

Mr. Baron. There were two prongs to the question, you have picked both of them up. One is whether you had ever heard of poison pills in connection with an assassination operation against Fidel Castro, and your testimony would be that you had

not, is that correct?

Mr. Halley. That is right. I would not have had access to those pills myself, nor did the Station. In other words, if I had wanted something like that, I would have had to corres-ponded with Washington in order to have had access to it, if in fact it existed.

Mr. Baron. You never had any such correspondence?

Mr. Halley. I never had any correspondence that I can recall.

Mr. Baron. The other problem was the supply of arms and equipment to which you already replied.

Have you ever read that Inspector General's Report of 1967, prepared at the request of the DCI to fill him in on any assassination efforts to which the CIA may have been connected?

Mr. Halley. No, I have not read the report.

Mr. Baron. Before you came here today you were not shown any excerpts from this report to refresh your recollection at the CIA?

Mr. Halley. The IG Report?

Mr. Baron. Yes.

Mr. Halley. No, I have not.

Mr. Baron. Were you shown any other documents at the CIA today to refresh -- or in preparation for today's session --

Mr. Halley. No.

In preparation for today's session I have had several

conversations with Seymour Boultin --

Mr. Baron. Walt Elder?

Mr. Halley. I talked to Walt Elder on the phone. You know the people who are involved in this thing. I have asked for that, I talked to our attorney, Clarke --

Mr. Baron. George Clarke?

Mr. Halley. Yes.

-- I talked to a number of people, I asked to see the newspaper clipping from the Miami Herald on the McGovern activity. Yes, I have looked at that kind of thing. But I have not looked at the specific IG Report. I have not read it, I have not seen an extract of the IG Report.

Mr. Baron. Were you given any specific instructions as to the kinds of things that you could say or not say here today?

Mr. Halley. You know, nothing beyond what you and I touched on which you have already put on the record.

Mr. Baron. Which is not to mention the names of CIA officers who are still operating under cover?

Mr. Halley. Right, or agents who would still be viable that I know of.

Mr. Baron. Right.

Then let me show you a document which we will mark as Halley Exhibit No. 2.

(The document referred to was marked Halley

Exhibit No. 2 for identification.)

Mr. Baron. Which is an excerpt from the Inspector General's Report of 1967 at pages 49 and 50, and I will ask you to read the portions that I will bracket which deal with a report of a meeting between yourself and William Harvey involving the supply of arms and equipment.

(Pause)

Mr. Halley. I have no reason to doubt this. I may have provided this support. I do not recall sitting in a parking lot observing --

Mr. Baron. For the record, we are discussing the passage that begins, "When the pills were given to Varona through Roselli, Varona requested arms and equipment needed for the support of his end of the operation. Roselli passed the request to Harvey. Harvey, with the help of [Mr. Halley], the chief of the JMWAVE Station, procured" ---

Continuing.--And then it continues to say a large shopping list of arms and equipment, which cost about $5,000 and were supplied in a parking lot of a drive-in restaurant in a rented U-Haul truck.

Would the cost of $5,000 have been an unusual expenditure at that time at JMWAVE Station for arms and equipment?

Mr. Halley. No, $5,000 would not have been an unusual expenditure.

Mr. Baron. Not unusual enough, in fact, for you to have a particular memory of the event?

Mr. Halley. No.

Now that I read over this thing, I do recall, as I told you earlier before you showed me this document something about a rented truck and being involved with Harvey in providing him some logistical support for an activity. I do not recall this specific list of equipment being involved, you know, somewhere you got this and if I could check it against the files, if there are any files available, I could verify whether this is correct or not.

Mr. Baron. Whether or not the particular list is correct, you would say that these couple of passages from the IG Report generally characterize your involvement with Harvey in this one incident correctly?

Mr. Halley. I would want to sharpen this up, because you have one, two, two paragraphs here. In the first paragraph there is a reference to some pills. I had nothing to do with any pills. I have no recollection of any pills.

Mr. Baron. Let us jump then to the very last statement and let me ask you if this confirms your own sense of your knowledge.

The report says: "Harvey says that [Halley]" -- here I am using your alias -- "never knew to whom delivery was made nor for what purpose. [Halley] was merely called upon to furnish support for a headquarters operation from which he was otherwise excluded."

Does that generally characterize correctly your point of

involvement with this activity?

Mr. Halley. I would say that is correct.

I want to go back to these other points, though, because I want to be meticulously correct here. I do not recall the specifics of this inventory of equipment. I do not recall, you know, sitting in a parking lot, surveilling any kind of a vehicle. On the other hand, I do recall having been involved with Harvey in some sort of an effort with a U-Haul truck. Now therefore that last sentence you have read is correct, I knew nothing about any of this delivery and I was called upon to furnish support for a headquarters operation from which I was otherwise excluded.

Mr. Baron. You are not denying, are you, that you may have sat near the parking lot and surveilled the truck until it was picked up?

Mr. Halley. I have no recollection --

Mr. Baron. One way or the other?

Mr. Halley. No, I would say that my sitting in a parked car with Harvey surveilling a parking lot is the kind of thing that would have stuck in my mind. I do not recall ever doing that and that is the thing that has me a little perplexed here and I am having trouble matching this thing up with my own memory. It would have been damned unusual for Harvey and I to have sat in a parking lot, and I just do not recall that.

I do have a vague recollection of being involved with him

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in some sort of caper involving a U-Haul truck.

Mr. Baron. At that time, if Harvey had made a request of you to supply $5,000 worth of equipment like explosives, detonators, .30 caliber rifles, .45 caliber handguns, radios and boat radar, would you have supplied that equipment to Harvey or to anyone he designated without asking him what the purpose of the operation was?

Mr. Halley. Yes, I would have supplied it to Harvey or to his designated representative, depending on how that person identified himself to me with the equipment that he requested. That was my chain of command and, if he had told me that he had wanted this material for any operational activity, I would have seen to it that it was issued to him. That is the way the Agency functions.

Mr. Baron. Would it have been standard procedure in a paramilitary operation to procure equipment that would not have been traceable to the United States as the IG Report indicates was done in this case?

Mr. Halley. It depends. It depends on what was the sponsorship that was trying to be conveyed to the paramilitary group.

In other words, let us say there was a Venezuelan business-man who may have been giving some assistance to a Cuban exile group. If somebody had gotten in touch with that Venezuelan businessman and he was saying I brought weapons into Florida

or equipment which I will give you, then maybe under that kind of a circumstance we wouldn't want anything that would clearly identify it with the U.S. government and then that would be the normal thing to do. I would have to know the sponsorship.

Mr. Baron. This request would not have been extraordinary either, to provide "sterile" equipment to a contact of Harvey's?

Mr. Halley. It would not have attracted my attention to make it seem out of the ordinary.

Mr. Baron. Were you aware of the presence of a CIA officer named Jim O'Connell in Florida at that time?

Mr. Halley. No.

Mr. Baron. Had you been aware of any operational involvement that Jim O'Connell had with anyone in Florida at any time?

Mr. Halley. I do not know Jim O'Connell. I have seen references to Jim O'Connell in Jack Anderson's columns and things like that since I have been reading the Press, but I do not know Jim O'Connell. If he walked into this room, I would not recognize him because I do not think I ever met the man. I do not know who he is. I asked several of my colleagues when I first saw his name appear in the Press who it was, and nobody could describe him in a way that would enable me to remember ever having seen or met the man.

Mr. Baron. Had you heard of the man in connection with operations against Cuba --

Mr. Halley. I had not.

Mr. Baron. -- before reading it in the newspapers recently?

Mr. Halley. Before reading in the newspapers and I do not know what year I first read this, because somewhere in the back of my mind is a Jack Anderson column --

Mr. Baron. And a Drew Pearson column before that.

Mr. Halley. -- a couple of years ago in which it was obvious that this was obtained from a military assignee to the Agency named Brad something -- I cannot think of his name right now -- and that he was the source of that information. I think somewhere in one of those articles, his name had appeared several years ago. I frankly do not know who the guy is.

Mr. Baron. At any point in your operational relationship with William Harvey in connection with Cuban affairs, did you suspect that an assassination operation was being run out of Task Force W against Fidel Castro?

Mr. Halley. No.

Mr. Baron. I would like to run down a list of the names of some people who were involved in one way or the other with an assassination operation that was being run out of Task Force W, and I will represent to you that there was indeed an assassination effort or a series of efforts run out of Task Force W beginning -- and out of the CIA -- beginning in October

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of 1960 involving connections between CIA officials and people who have been characterized as members of the Mafia, of the gambling Syndicate who had interests in Havana and which involved the passage of poison pills to people inside Cuba purportedly for use against Castro in the restaurant that he frequented. And this plot by William Harvey's own admission was directed by Harvey during Harvey's tenure as the Chief of Task Force W.

Mr. Halley. I take due note of what you are saying. I have no knowledge of that. I will be glad to comment on any of the names. My commenting on names is in no way to reflect any knowledge on my part of this particular activity, because I have no knowledge of it.

Mr. Baron. You have already stated that you have no knowledge of any assassination effort involving poison pills?

Mr. Halley. Yes.

Mr. Baron. Did you ever hear of any assassination schemes which may or may not have been put into effect involving exploding sea shells that Castro might pick up by scuba diving?

Mr. Halley. No, I do not recall any exploding sea shells while Castro was scuba diving, but the problem of Castro being an avid scuba diver is well-known to me. As I recall, somewhere in this thing there was a refugee group or Cuban exile group or somebody at one time in this whole activity who had focused on the question of whether Fidel Castro was vulnerable at the time that he was scuba diving. I have heard that discussed but

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frankly I do not remember in what forum, and your reference to the scuba diving has triggered that response. Nothing about exploding sea shells.

Mr. Baron. You do not recall ever hearing Desmond FitzGerald mention that subject or hearing that Desmond FitzGerald was involved in exploring that possibility, planting an exploding sea shell?

Mr. Halley. The exploding sea shell is enough of an off-beat kind of thing that I think I would have recalled it. I don't recall it.

I do recall Castro's scuba diving, and that representing a vulnerability and somewhere in the recesses of my memory, that does strike a bell with me that some exile group, somebody was talking about Fidel Castro being vulnerable while he was scuba diving.

Mr. Baron. Did you ever hear of a plan to present Castro with a skin-diving suit in which bacteria injurious to his health would have been cultured, bacteria that would have produced tuberculosis and would have produced a dreadful disease?

Mr. Halley. I have never heard of any bacteria approach to the problem of dealing with Fidel Castro.

I do want to come back to this that I do recall something about scuba diving, you know, on the range of Fidel being vulnerable at the time he was scuba diving, but I do not recall exploding sea shells or bacteria.

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Mr. Baron. Let us turn then to the list of name --

Mr. Halley. Wait a minute. Just let me make a note to myself.

(Pause)

Mr. Baron. Do you have any knowledge, acquired directly or indirectly, of any involvement of John Roselli in Cuban operations?

Mr. Halley. Other than reading the papers --

Mr. Baron. Other than what you read recently in the papers did you acquire any knowledge during your period as Chief of Station at JMWAVE of John Roselli's involvement in Cuban operations?

Mr. Halley. No. I had the impression from Harvey going off that he was meeting with somebody, and at one point in time I came to the impression that he was meeting a guy by the name of John. Who John was, I had no idea. We were involved in an attempt to try to find two Soviets at one point who were of interest. The fellow who provided the lead to that had been a member of one of the casinos in Cuba at some time.

Mr. Baron. Do you remember who that was?

Mr. Halley. No, I do not. I do not remember the man's name. It may come to me. You are asking me things that happened, you know, in 1962. As I have told you, I have been in a lot of places.

Anyway, when we put in a request for a trace on the source

of this lead, I was surprised with the speed with which we got a response back on this man and the details run down that we got on him in terms of who he was and where he worked and so forth, and I think I concluded at that time that somebody knew this fellow very well and somewhere in the whole labrynth, either Justice or we or somebody had access to somebody who could give us a great deal of insight into people who had been involved with the gambling establishment in Cuba.

Those are the only two things that I can say to you that I knew at the time. Obviously I have since read the papers and I have put together in my own mind by deduction that the John that I was aware of that Harvey was in touch with must be John Roselli, but I cannot provide to you --

Mr. Baron. Would this person with contacts with gambling interests in Havana have been Santos Trafficante?

Mr. Halley. I would have no way of knowing. I know who Santos Trafficante is.

Mr. Baron. How do you know this?

Mr. Halley. This is like asking me whether I knew where 7th Street is in downtown Miami. Santos Trafficante is a name that constantly was discussed among Cuban exiles and he was a well-known figure. You could not possibly be involved--

Mr. Baron. Did you know of any involvement that he had in Cuban operations that were connected in any way to the CIA?

Mr. Halley. None that I know of. To the best of my

recollection when I was in Miami, Santos Trafficante was in the Tampa area and that is my recollection of it at the time.

I also think that there was some large scandal, when I was in Miami, that was played up in the Press. I forget, some Federal agent who was somehow involved with the Mafia and with the Syndicate and there was some linkage in the Press between Santos Trafficante, Cubans and the Federal agent, but I do not remember the details of it.

Mr. Baron. The Federal agent was not a CIA employee?

Mr. Halley. No, he was not. My recollection is he was Narcotics or something.

Mr. Baron. You would make the same statement about John Roselli that you had no knowledge of his connection with any CIA sponsored operation against the Cuban government or against Castro personally?

Mr. Halley. At the time that I was there -- you know, I want to caution you that I have read the Press. If I have trouble sorting this out, I want you to understand that --

Mr. Baron. I understand that clearly.

Mr. Halley. -- that this is a dilemma for me. Obviously I told you I made my own deduction that John, the one that Harvey was in touch with, must have turned out in the context of 20/15 hindsight to be John Roselli. At the time, I did not know that.

Mr. Baron. What about Robert Maheu? Did you have any

knowledge that he was involved with Cuban operations affiliated with the CIA?

Mr. Halley. No.

Again, at the time I had no knowledge of Robert Maheu. I have since read about Robert Maheu in the Press, allegations and so forth. The name is familiar to me now.

Mr. Baron. The same question for Sam Giancana.

Mr. Halley. Again, I say in answer that at the time that I was involved in '62 and '65 I did not know anything about Sam Giancana. I have since read in the Press about him. Therefore, the name is familiar to me today.

Mr. Baron. Did you know at that time that Sheffield Edwards, who was then Director of the Office of Security, was connected in any way with those efforts against Castro personally or against the Castro government?

Mr. Halley. At that time, Shef Edwards was known to me as Director of Security. That is all. I had no knowledge of his involvement in any activity against Fidel Castro in a personal sense.

Shef Edwards did help Security Officers assigned to my staff in Miami. Therefore I would periodically go to him about the performance of his officers who were on my staff. So during the time that I was involved in Cuban affairs, yes, I did see him, yes, I did talk to him about Cuban affairs in Miami, the performance of his officers on my staff, but nothing about anything

that he might be doing, you know, against Fidel Castro.

Mr. Baron. I will represent to you that we have testimony from Edwards and from Jim O'Connell who was an officer working in the Office of Security under Edwards that they were involved in the early stages of an assassination plot against Castro which was run out of the Office of Security and later transferred to the DDP. But you are saying that you had no knowledge of any such operation at that time?

Mr. Halley. I had no knowledge. As I told you before, I did not even know Jim O'Connell.

Mr. Baron. Do you know a man by the name of Juan Orta?

Mr. Halley. That name is familiar to me. It is a name that has appeared, you know, across my scope. I cannot tell you why I am familiar with it. I would have to have a trace run, you know, and look at the results of the trace. But the name Juan Orta is known to me. That does ring a passive bell in my memory.

Mr. Baron. Do you remember William Harvey having any direct contact with Juan Orta?

Mr. Halley. No, I do not.

Mr. Baron. You do not have any specific recollection of Juan Orta's point of involvement in operations against Castro?

Mr. Halley. Juan Orta, no. It is a name I am familiar with. I think you will find, you know, that there are a number of names -- you asked me to look at that other thing -- a number

of names that do ring bells with me. I really would have to have back-up material to clarify why they ring a bell. This is one that happens to ring a bell with me, but I have no way of linking it to anything, and certainly I do not link it in any way in my memory to Mr. Harvey.

Mr. Baron. Do you remember ever hearing of a Cuban contact of William Harvey's who went by the name of Maceo?

Mr. Halley. No, I do not.

Mr. Baron. He also used the name of Garcia Gomez and the name Godoy.

Mr. Halley. The only name that rings any bell with me in Cuban contacts is Arturo Godoy. Is this the same man?

Mr. Baron. We do not have the first name of that alias. In what connection had you heard of Arturo Godoy?

Mr. Halley. My recollection is I've known Arturo Godoy is that he was the fellow who was active in the Cuban immigre community in Miami. That is all I can tell you at this point. I would have to go back.

Mr. Baron. You do not remember what group he was connected with?

Mr. Halley. No, I do not. But it was a name that obviously, you know, frequently referred to in reports. You know at one time we did monitor the Cuban community as to what was going on in terms of these various groups and what they had been doing. For some reason, Arturo Godoy rings a bell with

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me. As I recall, he was some sort of an activist in some Cuban exile group. To give you a definitive answer, you know, I would have to get the name, trace him, have a run on this fellow and try to put it together in some kind of context, but that is the only Godoy that rings any bells with me.

Certainly in my relationship with Harvey, this has no meaning to me. Godoy and Harvey just do not ring any bells.

Mr. Baron. One more name that we already discussed, that is Tony Varona.

Mr. Halley. Yes.

Mr. Baron. You said that you did know Tony Varona?

tape 5

Mr. Halley. I know of Tony Varona, that he was leader of the consejo, the revolutionary counsel that had been set up to sort of administer the Bay of Pigs operation. In the post Bay of Pigs era, Nua Cardona and Tony Varona were people who still appeared on the exile scene and were prominent. We had some dealings with Nua Cardona , officers in the Station had dealings with Nua Cardona and Tony Varona to pay off, you know, injuries to peopoe who had been suffered during the Bay of Pigs, things like that, widows and so on. I know who he is and so forth, the name is very familiar to me. I never personally met with Tony Varona.

Mr. Baron. Were you aware that William Harvey had an independent line of communication with Tony Varona?

Mr. Halley. No, I am not.

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Mr. Baron. Would it surprise you if that were the case?

Mr. Halley. The Tony Varona thing would surprise me, frankly. I think I would not -- I would be surprised, yes.

Mr. Baron. Why is that?

Mr. Halley. Well, because here is a case where the guy was a prominent exile figure, essentially residing in Miami, and I knew of no contacts or had no reasons to suspect any contacts with this kind of an exile figure, though once it specifically appeared, I was aware of and it was discussed. This was done under FitzGerald's stewardship with the Task Force. I was aware of that. I would be surprised if someone was in touch with Tony Varona and I did not know about it. If you told me that is what happened, that is what Harvey has testified to, I accept that. I am surprised by it.

Mr. Baron. What was the nature of the CIA relationship to Artime?

Mr. Halley. Well, the Miami Station had no direct relationship with him. As to the nature of the project, you know Artime ran from the Agency, from other people who actually worked with him on a first time basis.

Mr. Baron. Were you aware of a project called AMLASH?

Mr. Halley. Let me make sure we are talking about the same thing.

Mr. Baron. Off the record.

(Discussion off the record.)

Mr. Baron. We have just gone off the record to straighten out the fact that we are both talking about the same Cuban high military officer who was known to the CIA by the cryptonym of AMLASH.

Correct me if I am wrong, Mr. Halley, that you and I agree that we are referring to the same person that we have identified off the record?

Mr. Halley. Yes, we have.

Mr. Baron. Were you aware of contacts between AMLASH-1, as he was known, and Artime?

Mr. Halley. I think at the time that this was going on, I do not know whether I was or I was not -- I was aware that the CIA was in touch with AMLASH.

Mr. Baron. Did you deal directly with the case officers who ran AMLASH?

Mr. Halley. I did not. My recollection of this AMLASH case is as follows. At some point in time, I had a conversation with Desmond FitzGerald in Washington during one of my periodic visits to Washington from Miami. We discussed at that meeting the nature of our approach to the military establishment in Cuba. In the context of that conversation, Mr. FitzGerald asked me if I thought whether it would be a good idea for him to meet one of these Cuban military personalities, and he subsequently identified to me the personality he was talking about was AMLASH-1.

My advice to him was that it would probably not be a good idea for him to meet him, and the only thing that I could see coming out of that kind of a contact would be that he, Mr. FitzGerald, would get a personal feel for what makes some of these people tick, in human terms, and that that probably was too high a price to pay for the prospect if anything went wrong, an individual as prominent in Washington as, both within the Agency and the social world in Washington, would be exposed in the Press. That would create a flap that I thought was not worth what would be gained from that meeting.

Mr. Baron. Would this have been in the fall of 1963?

Mr. Halley. I have no recollection of the time.

Subsequent to that, Mr. FitzGerald told me that he had indeed met him and that he had had an interesting conversation with him. I subsequently recall that this gentleman was met in Spain at some point in time --

Mr. Baron. This gentleman being AMLASH-1?

Mr. Halley. This gentleman, being AMLASH-1, was met in Spain. I also recall after having left the Cuban activity that I read a Press article showing that he had been apprehended and I remember reading the publicity of that particular activity. It is also my recollection that we put in a cache for him.

That is about the sum and substance of it.

Mr. Baron. Do you recall what the purpose of that cache

was? Was it a cache of arms?

Mr. Halley. It was a cache. I think that you could go to the record to establish what was in the cache. I do not recall specifically what the material was that was in the cache.

Mr. Baron. At the point that you were having these conversations with Desmond FitzGerald, though, in the first instance the prospect of his contact directly with AMLASH-1, in the second instance his reaction to his contact with AMLASH-1 do you recall FitzGerald mentioning to you the fact that AMLASH had requested assurances that high officials of the U.S. government would stand behind him if he undertook operations on behalf of the CIA?

Mr. Halley. I do not recall this at the time.

You know, I also want to say, as you probably know from the record, I was later Chief of the WH Division from 1972 to 1973, and I did read some of the files. I am familiar with the case. But at the time -- I am trying to be schizophrenic, you know, to put this in the time sequence in which we are talking about. My recollection of that is that I did not know that.

Mr. Baron. It would then be your testimony that Mr. FitzGerald never broached with you the subject of making a representation to AMLASH-1 that Robert Kennedy or other high officials of the U.S. government would stand behind him?

Mr. Halley. I do not recall that kind of a conversation taking place with FitzGerald in this timeframe that we are talking about.

Mr. Baron. Do you recall any such conversation at any point?

Mr. Halley. No, I do not, in the timeframe that we are talking about.

Mr. Baron. When I say at any point, I mean at any point since 1962.

Mr. Halley. Well, you know, in the period 1972-73, I did look at some of the files, I did read some of the files. I am familiar that such conversations took place and that there were a series of meetings. You know, I know who the case officer was and so forth.

Mr. Baron. You never discussed the subject directly with FitzGerald?

Mr. Halley. With FitzGerald, no. I can only say that my knowledge of that is secondhand from having subsequently read the files.

Mr. Baron. Was it your impression at that time that one of the objectives of the contact with AMLASH-1 was the assassination of Fidel Castro or other high Cuban leaders?

Mr. Halley. No. I never had the impression that assassination was a thrust of the activity. In other words, we were working across-the-board, both in the context that Desmond

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FitzGerald and his staff were working on what I was doing in Miami to try to establish contacts with the Cuban military. In other words, we saw this as a multi-faceted approach. First, we wanted penetrations of the Cuban military so that we could collect intelligence. What were their strengths, weaknesses, what was their mood, where were things going? Secondly, we wanted from these sources operational intelligence. Who -- in other words, who in these groups were dissatisfied as Fidel consolidated. Who could provide leadership for a counter-movement against Fidel?

We were looking for people, once we had identified them, to see if we could establish contacts with any of these leaders so we could see whether there was a basis for working toward an overthrow of the Castro government. You know, those were the basic steps.

Now as you got down to talking about how you overthrow Castro, obviously the question comes in of how does a group who wants to run a coup or take power take power, and obviously one of the things that has to be looked at is where does the existing leadership going to be during this event, who has control of the various units. So our discussions were all in that context.

Mr. Baron. Would it have surprised you or would it surprise you now to learn that at least part of the contact with AMLASH would have involved planning for an assassination

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attempt against Castro.

Mr. Halley. I certainly was not aware of that at the time, as I recall from, you know, looking at the files in the '72-'73 period, seeing any evidence of that in the file at the time.

Mr. Baron. There are fourteen folders in the AMLASH file. Did you read all of those files?

Mr. Halley. No, I did not.

Mr. Baron. How did you gather your impression that that was in the AMLASH files?

Mr. Halley. I think I may have read one or two volumes of whatever my question was at the time, because these cases keep coming up. You know, there must have been some inquiry at the time that necessitated my looking at the folder or discussing it with my staff and so on.

Mr. Baron. As far as you knew, what was the objective of the contact with Artime?

Mr. Halley. You mean the CIA contact with Artime?

Mr. Baron. Yes.

Mr. Halley. As a concept, the Artime thing was looked at as another track, an approach to the overall Cuban problem to see if they could sort of do it on their own. If they could simply be given, you know, X number of dollars, some equipment, some guidance, and give them an opportunity to find a Cuban solution to what was a Cuban problem. That was also, you know,

and if you have not, you should talk to the people who ran the Artime operation, when this was set up, I think I participated in giving Artime some tutorial training for a couple of weeks when this operation was first established in order to familiarize him with some of the problems of trying to manage a large operation against Cuba because he had been out of things for a couple of years.

Mr. Baron. Were you aware that he had been supplied a weapon which we already agreed could be characterized as an assassination weapon?

Mr. Halley. You say "we." You and I?

Mr. Baron. Yes.

Mr. Halley. Which weapon was that?

Mr. Baron. A high-powered rifle with long-range and low muzzle velocity.

Mr. Halley. I am aware of the fact of this project that Artime was involved in that he got a number of weapons, any number of which could have been used for sniper type activities. I am aware of the fact that he had a base in Nicaragua to have activities, so I would find it hard to single out a weapon. My recollection of that that he was given a large number of weapons.

Mr. Baron. Was one of Artime's objectives to have been to assassinate Fidel Castro?

Mr. Halley. Not that I am aware of.

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Mr. Baron. Did you ever hear any discussion to the effect that the Agency was attempting to achieve through Artime indirectly what they did not want to achieve directly in a fashion that would be attributed to the CIA, namely the assassination of Castro?

Mr. Halley. I think that you have tied two issues together there and I do not think I can answer the question that way. I would like to separate the question into two parts.

Mr. Baron. Go ahead.

Mr. Halley. The first part, as I mentioned to you earlier the CIA did establish a relationship with Artime and he was given funds and other support to run his approach to solving the Cuban problem. He was one of two such activities that were run at the time. And therefore I think that your statement is correct that perhaps he was set up so that there could be no direct attribution in his activities to the United States, because he set up a base in Nicaragua, and the story as I recall it was put out that he was receiving assistance from the Nicaraguan government, and therefore there was a part of the whole cover story, if you will, for him.

So, yes, there was an attempt to set him up as a parallel track or a separate track. That does not follow from that, in my perspective, that was geared towards an assassination operation, because that was a fantastically large operation involving lots of people, you know, with substantial amounts of

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money. I was opposed to it at the time. And once it was set up, and I did what I was supposed to do, which was to train Artime and contribute to his training, I then did not pay an awful lot of attention to the thing except what I picked up, you know, over the years, and again in the '72-'73 period, and talked to officers who had, you know, more intimate knowledge of it and got an appraisal of it as to what they thought had occurred.

Mr. Baron. Had you heard at any point that Artime was supplied weapons for the specific purpose of assassinating Castro?

Mr. Halley. No, not for the specific purpose of assassinating Castro.

Mr. Baron. Was it your general impression that AMLASH-1 was a reliable agent?

Mr. Halley. I really do not know that much about him, you know. This was an operation that was run at that time out of Washington and, you know, my knowledge was as I described it to you, the conversations with FitzGerald, Madrid, newspaper articles, so forth, in that particular timeframe.

Mr. Baron. Did the CIA to your knowledge use any gambling Syndicate contacts inside Cuba or people outside Cuba who were connected to gambling interests inside Cuba for any operational purpose including the intelligence gathering?

Mr. Halley. The only case that I recall is this case that

I mentioned to you earlier when we were in touch with an individual whose name I cannot remember who had been involved with one of the gambling houses in Cuba who came to us with leads to Soviets from a missile site who wanted to defect. That is the only case that I know of. I cannot think of the man's name. I can give you a physical description of him, and so forth. I honestly cannot think of his name.

Mr. Baron. You are not aware of any other use of people with gambling interests in Cuba for intelligence gathering?

Mr. Halley. Not that I am aware of. If you have something specific that you want to pursue, if you can give me some other clue than that, I just do not, out of my past memory, I simply do not recall any other case but that one.

Mr. Baron. Are you aware of any contact between the CIA and Meyer Lansky?

Mr. Halley. No, I am not aware of any contact between the CIA and Meyer Lansky.

Mr. Baron. Was Howard Hunt connected with any Cuban operations during the period of your tenure at JMWAVE Station?

Mr. Halley. Howard Hunt was involved in the Bay of Pigs Operation. After the Bay of Pigs Operation wss over, he did not participate in the Cuban activities that I was aware of. You may know something that I do not know, because, you know, you have asked me a couple of questions here of things that I am not aware of. You may know something that I do not, but

certainly he did not come across my horizon at the time that I was in Miami.

Mr. Baron. Have you ever heard the phrase Executive Action?

Mr. Halley. Yes.

Mr. Baron. What does that signify to you?

Mr. Halley. Well, Executive Action is some sort of a euphemism -- to eliminate somebody, I guess is how it appears in the popular jargon.

Mr. Baron. Did you hear it in the Agency?

Mr. Halley. No, I think that this is a term that has been bandied about in the Press that has come about in the Press to be synonymous with killing somebody or something like that.

Mr. Baron. It is not, as far as you know, a euphemism in common usage within the Agency?

Mr. Halley. No.

Mr. Baron. Had you ever heard of the ZRRIFLE Project run by William Harvey?

Mr. Halley. No, I do not know what it is.

Mr. Baron. Have you ever heard of --

Mr. Halley. I want to make sure here that I am accurate, you know. You are asking me ZRFIFLE. That is a cryptonym for something.

Mr. Baron. Let me explain further.

Mr. Halley. I want to sort of say, in the last thirteen

years I have seen literally --

(Discussion off the record.)

Mr. Halley. Let me go back. You asked me about ZRRIFLE. This is one of a thousand or hundreds of cryptonyms. Every day I read, you know, hundreds of pages of traffic, so when you ask me do I know what ZRRIFLE is, I must answer you off the top of my head no. I have tried to be helpful. I have asked you several times if you could give me a steering tip or show me what direction you are going, I might be able to try to comment on it, but ZRRIFLE as such means nothing to me. You really could not expect that it would, given the thousands of these things that come across my desk.

Mr. Baron. That is absolutely understandable. I want to try to see what happens in the way of getting an unrefreshed recollection from you, then I will go back over these two, especially the next one, QJWIN. Do you recall a CIA asset who went by the cryptonym QJWIN?

Mr. Halley. No, I do not. Knowing the system, and so forth, normally it would have something to do with Spain. It does not ring any bells with me. That is all I can give you, a sort of Pavlovian response. You flash QJWIN on the screen, I am telling you now I do not know, but it probably has something to do with Spain.

Mr. Baron. Were you aware that a project involving the development of a capability of carrying on assassination was

run by William Harvey?

Mr. Halley. To develop the capability to carry on the assassination?

Mr. Baron. Yes.

Mr. Halley. No. I have no knowledge of Harvey being focused on a project or given the capability of carrying one out.

Mr. Baron. Harvey has testified, as has Richard Bissell, I will represent to you, that instruction was given by Bissell to Harvey to set up, to develop such a capability in early 1961 and that Harvey took steps to develop such a capability in coordination with an asset in New York named QJWIN and I think that period of greatest activity was in 1962 and WIN was involved in spotting potential assets among the criminal underworld in Europe and might be used for any number of dirty deeds.

Mr. diGenova. It should be emphasized that the Executive Action Plan that you are referring to has had as its goal the incapacitation of foreign leaders, one possibility of incapacitation being the ultimate weapon, assassination. It was just not assassination. It was a spectrum of activities that could be used to incapacitate a foreign leader anywhere from illness, chemical warfare, and then including death. Correct me if I am wrong, but it was not just assassination.

Mr. Baron. Does that ring any bells?

Mr. Halley. No, it does not.

Mr. Baron. Do you have any recollection that the ZRRIFLE Project involving the development of an "Executive Action" capability would have been tied in in any way to an operation against Cuba?

Mr. Halley. No, that does not ring any bells, none whatsoever.

Mr. Baron. I would like to introduce as Halley Exhibit 3 an article from Harper's Magazine entitled "The Kennedy Vendetta," subtitled "How the CIA Waged a Silent War Against Cuba," written by Taylor Branch and George Crile III.

Let me show you this article and let me ask you whether you have read it?

Mr. Halley. Yes, I have read the article.

(The document referred to was marked Halley Exhibit No. 3 for identification.)

Mr. Baron. Let us pick out some specifics and discuss them briefly here.

Near the beginning of this article, it mentions that JMWAVE Station operated within an annual budget of well in excess of $50 million.

Would that be accurate to you?

Mr. Halley. I do not recall whether that is an accurate figure. We would have to go back to the records. You know, as I explained to you earlier, the start of the operation taking place in March and escalated up to a high point and then dropped off. In the budgetary cycle, we are dealing with a mass of figures, and I would not want to give you an inaccurate answer. That is something that could be researched -- we have the files -- rather than speculate for you on the buildup and reduction in the operation. I do not feel that is useful.

Mr. Baron. As a ballpark figure, would you be able to place the annual budget of the Station in the neighborhood of tens of millions of dollars?

Mr. Halley. No, I would not, because of this transition, you know, period, the costs were very high in the beginning to get a start-up operation, brought to a certain peak, and then tapered off and starting to be peeled back. I would not want to draw a figure of --

Mr. diGenova. What would the start-up cost?

Mr. Halley. In terms of what they involved or dollars?

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Mr. diGenova. Dollars.

Mr. Halley. I have no recollection of the dollars.

Mr. Baron. Would you say that $50 million would be in the right ballpark for your activities at the peak?

Mr. Halley. I just have no recollection of the dollar figure. You might want to get that figure when you can retrieve it in the files. It is available.

Mr. Baron. Were the operations of JMWAVE coordinated with other Latin American CIA Station's, as the article indicates here?

Mr. Halley. I think my recollection of that phase is that Cuban activities with other Latin American stations were coordinated with JMWAVE.

Mr. Baron. Coordinated with JMWAVE?

Mr. Halley. With JMWAVE.

Mr. Baron. Who had the central coordinating responsibility?

Mr. Halley. Washington.

Mr. Baron. Was that delegated by Washington to you?

Mr. Halley. No. Essentially Washington had the overall coordinating responsibility, but that needs some elaboration. Let me say that we would become aware in our activities in Miami that a number of interesting people had come in on a flight to Mexico City. We would send a cable down to Mexico City with an information copy to Washington outlining who we were interested in, and I would probably send somebody down to

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Mexico to look at the particular Cuban or the operational opportunity in conjunction with the Station Chief in Mexico City. So we were in some cases a clearinghouse.

The final coordination authority rested in Washington. I will say that if Miami wanted to do something and for local political reasons in Mexico the Mexican Station Chief did not want to do it, that would be adjudicated, not by Miami, but by Washington.

Mr. Baron. Let me quote you a passage here and see if it comports with our discussions earlier of special arrangements you may have, the JMWAVE Station may have had, with law enforcement authorities in Florida.

The article says: "All the boat missions to Cuba were technically illegal under the Neutrality Act, the Maritime Laws, and Immigtation statutes, so that the Station had to work out special arrangements with Customs, Immigration and the Coast Guard."

Is that generally accurate?

Mr. Halley. I think, as I described to you before, there was coordination with the Coast Guard in terms of vessel departures. The other is Immigration?

Mr. Baron. Customs, Immigration and Coast Guard.

Mr. Halley. Immigration, there would not have been coordination on a particular, you know, boat dispatch. On the other hand, let's say if a mission aborted for some reason and

a small boat could not recover its position and get back to the mother ship to be picked up and it was adrift or came in to one of the islands or came in to the Florida coast anywhere and was picked up and picked up by Immigration inspectors, then they would ask to have their case referred to a particular individual. It may have been a code number, a color code, it may have been phrase. But then Immigration would get in touch with us and say we have this group, here is what they say, what is your interest in this particular group, and then that would be adjudicated at that point.

Now the third group was Customs. Customs did have a number of patrols and at times when boat loadings were conducted off the Florida Keys in particular, those were coordinated with the Coast Guard so they would not be expending their manpower to run down groups that were extricating with us, in fact the Agency was doing.

Mr. Baron. The article continues to say: "It was illegal for agents to travel around with machine guns and plastic explosives in the cars, as they often did. The Station had to establish liaison with seventeen police jurisdictions along the Florida coast and into the Keys. The result was that any agent who was arrested for anything from drunken driving to illegal possession of firearms would be quickly released."

Is that accurate?

Mr. Halley. I commented on that before, and we are on the

record on that as saying that we did not drive around, there were no vehicles moving, manned by these Cubans with arms and weapons on them.

In other words, you are coming back to the same point, because as I explained to you, the weapons were only given to them on the vessel and taken back from them when they came back from a mission, so that the statement is not actually correct.

Mr. Baron. What about the end of that passage where they say that the result, and I understand that you would disagree as to whether it was a result of this kind of a practice which you say was not carried on at all.--

Mr. Halley. It was not.

Mr. Baron. Did a situation exist where any agent who was arrested for anything from drunken driving to illegal possession of firearms would be quickly released.

tape 6

Mr. Halley. I have to go back and divide your question into two parts. There were no firearms --

Mr. Baron. I am not saying firearms supplied to them by the CIA for a CIA mission or any agent travelling down the street in Miami who happened to have a Saturday Night Special in his car or who happened to be drunk while driving. Would such a person be released right away or once the CIA connection surfaced?

Mr. Halley. My answer to that is no. In other words, if he had a Saturday Night Special and was picked up by the police

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and detained, and if he then asked to be in contact with us, the case would be looked at at that particular point and if he had a Saturday Night Special, you know, there would not be any intervention on his behalf because it had nothing to do with his task on the behalf of CIA.

I did mention to you earlier we had training camps in various parts of the State. If somebody came out of the training camp and did get drunk and was picked up and did not speak English or something and the police jurisdictions did have a way of getting in touch with us and we might intervene on a case of disorderly conduct.

Mr. diGenova. How was that established, the relationship of liaison with these jurisdictions. Had it been set up with JMWAVE directly through Washington and down through the FBI? How had that been done?

Mr. Halley. It varied. When we started expanding the operation, you know, there had already been a Station there and there also were two security units in the greater Miami area. In some cases the existing contacts at the Station were expanded, the same with Dade County. In other cases, the security of personnel who had established contact with other jurisdictions were used to effect the introduction. In some cases, we had our security people who were on my staff go out to these jurisdictions and identify themselves simply with a badge and a name and discuss the kinds of things that they were

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interested in so that there would not be a cross of problems with these jurisdictions and therefore a liaison was opened on that basis, a multiplicity of approaches.

Mr. Baron. The article discusses the fact that regular commando raids were run out of JMWAVE Station to the shore of Cuba, and that those commandos were equipped with all kinds of explosives and armaments.

Is that generally a fair statement, that we were running on a regular basis commando raids to Cuba?

Mr. Halley. Yes. There were a series of commando raids run from the Miami Station against targets in Cuba.

Mr. Baron. Were assassination weapons, that is, high-powered rifles with low muzzle velocity and telescopic sights, supplied to those commando teams as a matter of course?

Mr. Halley. No, they were not. For most of those commando teams, you were looking for a different kind of a weapon. You are looking for a weapon with a high range of fire power over a short distance to deal with an emergency situation rather than the kind of, you know, weapon that we are talking about.

In other words, you would find that type of a group armed with a submachine gun, as for example.

Mr. Baron. If an assassination weapon as we have described it was supplied to a commando team, they would have to have a specific purpose in mind for its use?

Mr. Halley. Yes.

Also, again, all of these weapons were controlled, the weapons that were issued at the time of the mission on the mother ship and picked up on the team's return to the mother ship, so there was accountability for the weapons.

Mr. Baron. Would it have been unusual to supply what we have called an assassination weapon to a commando team?

Mr. Halley. Well, that depends on the mission. For instance, let me use an example.

Most of the missions that were run were run against targets that were in fairly close proximity to the shore. If you are going to put a party to attack your objectives, let us say the objective was a petroleum storage tank, if you were going to do this by putting charges up against the petroleum storage tank that meant that you had to have a group infiltrate close enough to put the charges on the tank. Some distance away from them you would give them a second element of the commando team which would be providing covering fire for this group in case they got into trouble and cannot handle it on the ground. This covering fire group might have had a light machine gun, a Belgian weapon. They could have these kinds of weapons and they did have these kinds of weapons which in the definition you are using could be used as a sniper weapon or whatever, but the basic reason for having that weapon was to provide fire support for the other members of the commando team. And therefore when

this mission was over and they returned, those weapons were taken back from them and accounted for. They were shaken down so that we did not have weapons disappearing out of our control.

Mr. Baron. Such weapons, high-powered rifles with telescopic scopes, conceivably with silencers, were supplied with some regularity, but they were kept under tight control?

Mr. Halley. We had high-powered rifles. I cannot think now of a case where there was a sniper scope attached to the rifle. I can think of no case where there was a silencer attached to a rifle in any of these commando raids. There were a number of raids conducted, some of them involved teams of fifteen or twenty men. I am not prepared to say that no man ever had one, but I do not recall one. You know, if you gave me an inventory which are in the files, for each of the operations and say here is the operation plan, does this list of equipment fifteen years later look reasonable to you, I would be able to tell you yes or no. But off the top of my head, I do not recall a sniper scope or a silenced rifle.

Mr. Baron. Do you know a man by the name of Rolando Martinez?

Mr. Halley. Of Watergate involvement?

Mr. Baron. Yes.

Mr. Halley. Yes, I know of him. I have never met him personally. I know of him. He was a member of our boat

infiltration team. He was a UDT man.

Mr. Baron. In the Harper's article, it says that Martinez indicated that "More than once he was given personal charge of weapons drops in which special rifles with silencers and telescopic sights were left in designated inland spots."

Do you know of a factual basis for that statement?

Mr. Halley. Martinez is undoubtedly factually correct when he says he put caches on the coast of Cuba that contained weapons. I do not know how he would be able to tell what kind of weapons were in the cache. The reason I say that is that when one of these missions were planned, the cache was put together and packed by our logistics group and once the cache was put together it was brought on board the vessel and the cache was then turned over to the team for infiltration so he would never have seen the contents of the cache, he would not have opened it up because it was always in a sealed container.

It is conceivable that in the pre-mission briefing that he got before he went down that he was told that we are putting in a cache containing a radio or putting in a cache containing weapons because that would influence what he selected as a cache type. In other words, if it were a radio, we would want it higher and drier than we would a can containing weapons that were wraped in cosmolene and so forth. He might know that they were weapons, but he wouldn't know that they were silenced and they had a scope. I must honestly say to you I doubt that.

Mr. Baron. Did you know of any weapons drops that were made for the purpose of supplying someone inside Cuba with a weapon for the assassination of Fidel Castro?

Mr. Halley. No, not for that clearly stated purpose. As I told you, we put a lot of weapons caches in. The weapons were multi-purpose weapons, could be used. I know of no cache that went in specifically for the task of playing a contributory role to assassinating Fidel Castro.

Mr. Baron. It would not have been contrary to the policy directives under which you were operating at the time to supply such a weapon to someone inside Cuba who might have access to Castro?

Mr. Halley. No, it would not have been. For instance, I can remember several resistance groups that we had that had two or three hundred men that we were supplying on a regular basis.

Mr. diGenova. Inside Cuba?

Mr. Halley. Inside Cuba, that were essentially living in the bush to a large extent, whom we did supply weapons to and got ammunition to them and so forth. And that was why I was very careful when you mentioned this linkage before to saying that I could not be a guarantor as to what these men would do with these weapons once they got their hands on them. They were free agents.

Mr. diGenova. This is an interesting point. This has come up before. We are aware of our reading of the record that

what you have said is a concern of not only yourself in terms of realizing that it was a possibility but of people like Dean Rusk and Mr. McCone, who also said, you have to realize then once these agents are in another country and are supplied that there is little if anything we can do to control those weapons after they receive them. It would be safe to say that that, of course, was understood that there was a lack of control, and to the extent that it was a problem, it existed and had to be tolerated because of the nature of the operation, would that be correct?

Mr. Halley. I do not know whether I want to phrase it exactly as you have in terms of this lack of control. Our mission in dealing with these groups was to first, to put them in areas where we did not have other intelligence covers. Their first task was to collect intelligence.

The second task was to organize a resistance which would take armed action if we ever got a total package put together that gave us an opportunity -- that was the first and secondary missions. Once we issued the weapons to the team leader, if you will, he had freedom to recruit from among the peasants anybody he wanted to. If he gave the peasant a weapon, there was no guarantee either by the team leader or by us that that peasant would not do something that we did not want him to do. To even shoot a militiaman, you could have an argument, you know, over a woman. Any number of things.

Mr. diGenova. Were there any restrictions, once, for example, those weapons caches were delivered either by land or air -- and we have spoken to Mr. Murray who was in the Havana Station, for example, for awhile and Arthur Avignon who was head of the Havana Station for awhile who indicated that they were aware of the weapons drops and were intimately familiar with where they would be.

Mr. Halley. That was all before my time. I have no knowledge of that. During my time, we made no drops by air.

Mr. diGenova. Were there any limitations that were placed of how the weapons would be used that were delivered into Cuba to these internal resistance groups?

Mr. Halley. I cannot speak to this period that you are addressing.

Mr. diGenova. During your period.

Mr. Halley. During my period, the weapons were issued essentially as self-protection for the people who were living in the bush. Secondly, to be used in a military operation at such time as we got the whole package together. Thirdly, they were to be used for self-protection if they conducted raids, ambushes, sabotage operations.

Mr. Baron. There is one further quote from Martinez in this article that I would like to ask you to comment on. He is quoted as saying: "I took a lot of weapons to Cuba, some of them were very special weapons for special purposes. They

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were powerful rifles with sophisticated scopes, Springfields with bolt action, rifles only used by snipers. They were not sent to shoot pigeons or to kill rabbits. Everyone in the Underground was plotting to kill Castro and the CIA was helping the Underground. I was with the Underground as well as the CIA, so you can see I was involved in the plots too, but that is also obvious."

You commented before that there was a lot of talk in the air about assassinating Castro. Martinez seems to be taking that a few steps further, saying that there were actual plots underway in the Cuban Underground to assassinate Castro and that people who worked with the CIA were aware of those plots and were aiding them in effect by the weapons they were supplying.

Is that an accurate statement?

Mr. Halley. No, I do not think I can go along with that statement. Martinez' role as I described it to you, he is accurate when he says that weapons were put in and that he participated in putting them in. I again question how he would know what was in each cache. I just do not see that, and I would have to accept that as a sort of secondhand statement by him because of the way that the caches were put together. I just do not see his knowing that.

Now I don't want to exclude, however, that any particular kind of weapon did not go to Cuba. Maybe bolt-action

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Springfields did go in.

Mr. diGenova. Could he have found out about this after the fact from people that he knew in Cuba, members of the resistance in Cuba that he knew of who would have told him the nature of the items that they would have received in a cache delivery? Would that be one way that he could have found out? Was he that intimately involved, to your knowledge?

Mr. Halley. He was not at the time. This is the period that I am familiar with, '62-'65. I do not know. Maybe some of these people have come out since then, and maybe he has talked to people who have come out in '68, '69, things like that. I cannot exclude that.

At the time, I do not think, however, he would have had that kind of firsthand knowledge, and therefore I have trouble with that statement and I cannot identify with it.

Mr. Baron. The Harper's article says: "By the end of 1961, several men affiliated with the CIA had already been foiled in attempts to kill him" -- meaning Castro -- "among them, Luis Toroella, executed; Eloy Gutierrez Menoyo, still in prison; William Morgan, executed; and Antonio Veciana, escaped to the United States. Had these men succeeded, their efforts would have been tied to the U.S. only indirectly, if at all."

Let me show you the passage I am reading from and ask you whether you have any knowledge of the connection of any of those men named to the CIA.

(Pause)

Mr. Halley. No, there is no connection that I know of between these names and CIA. This guy Luis Toroella does not ring any bells with me. Eloy Gutierrez Menoyo was a leader of Alpha 66. He may have been in Cuba in '61. During the time that I was involved in Cuban affairs he was in exile for -- he was in Miami for a long period of time.

Mr. Baron. Can you explain what Alpha 66 is for the record?

Mr. Halley. Alpha 66 was a Cuban exile organization that was engaged in a number of raids against the Cuban government. They claimed to have attacked Cuban shipping, fishing boats, and claimed to have an organization in Cuba that was a resistance organization. Gutierrez Menoyo was therefore a well-known name to me. We had no direct contact with him.

William Morgan is also a well-known name. His activities and exploits in Cuba are well-known to anybody that has dealt with Cuban affairs.

Mr. Baron. Do you have any knowledge of a connection between any of these people and assassination attempts against Fidel Castro?

Mr. Halley. I have none, no connection between these names and CIA and attempts to assassinate Fidel Castro.

Mr. Baron. The fact that they are listed here as having been involved in assassination attempts whether or not they

were connected with CIA is news to you?

Mr. Halley. Well, no, I would not say that. If you had Gutierrez Menoyo sitting here and if he were to say in 1962 I attempted to shoot Fidel Castro, that is Gutierrez Menoyo did this, I would have no reason to doubt. I would have no basis for proving it, either.

Mr. Baron. You have never heard of these alleged assassination attempts before?

Mr. Halley. No.

Morgan's name I would have to do a file trace to get myself back up to date. Morgan did get himself in trouble with Fidel over some issue,, as I recall was in prison. I do not recall, remember if he was executed, although this says he was executed.

Mr. Baron. What about the last name on the list, Antonio Veciana?

Mr. Halley. That is a name that rings a bell with me, but I do not attach anything to it. In other words, it is a name I have probably read in various and sundry kinds of reports. I remember no operational relationship with him between the Miami Station and this man during my tenure in Miami.

Mr. Baron. During your tenure, would you have been in a position to know that these people had led assassination attempts against Castro, if that were indeed the fact?

Mr. Halley. Not necessarily. I would say that the odds would have been high that we would have, particularly, say

Gutierrez Menoyo. We did have a steady stream of reporting on the activities of all exile groups and Alpha 66 was high on the list of groups that had a capability of doing this kind of thing. Therefore, they received quite a bit of coverage from us, from the FBI, from Customs, and others.

They were on everybody's sort of watch list.

Mr. Baron. Let us turn now to a document that we will introduce as Exhibit 4, which is a report by Fidel Castro on alleged attempts to assassinate him that he connects to the United States government and especially to the CIA.

(The document referred to was marked Halley Exhibit No. 4 for identification.)

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Mr. Baron. Which was released recently by George McGovern, to whom Castro had sent this report.

Mr. Halley, is it true that I had asked you to review this report before we began our session today?

Mr. Halley. Yes, you did, you did ask me to look at the report.

Mr. Baron. Can you point to any names or incidents in this report that are connected in any way in your mind to actual assassination attempts against Cuba -- Castro?

Mr. Halley. No, I cannot point to any names that in my mind are attached to an assassination attempt against Castro. You asked me to look at this originally to see if any of the names were familiar to me in any way. I made a list of some of the names that rang a bell with me, for various reasons.

One name is Humberto Sori Marin. I recall that he was active, he was active with the DRE.

Mr. Baron. At what page is that?

Mr. Halley. There is no page number.

For instance, here's a name, Humberto Sori Marin. That is familiar to me. I do not know whether that was from the reporting showing that he was in prison, you know, we constantly got reporting on, or why, it is a name that I recognize in the counterrevolutionary sense, that it is something that crossed my desk, to see the name.

All right. The other name that is familiar is Tony Varona.

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That was a Cuban exile leader. We talked about Tony Varona. I told you I did not know that Tony Varona had any connection with Mr. Harvey.

There is another name in here, Manolo Ray. I mentioned Manolo Ray to you. He was one of two exile leaders who had a relationship with the Agency. You know, I told you Artime was one; Manolo Ray is another. He is familiar to me as a result of that.

Mr. Baron. You did not know of any involvement of Manolo Ray in an assassination effort against Castro?

Mr. Halley. I do not.

Here is another name mentioned in the same paragraph, Aureliano Sanchez Arango. That is a name that is familiar to me as a prominent Cuban exile.

Mr. Baron. You have no more specific recollection?

Mr. Halley. I am trying to be responsive to your question, telling you which names ring a bell with me as I run through this.

Mr. Baron. All I am trying to do is clarify for the record the exact nature of your recollection of each of these names.

Do you have any recollection of a plot alluded to in this report to shoot Castro with a bazooka at the Havana Stadium?

Mr. Halley. No, I do not have any recollection of that. According to this, if this is correct, it took place in October

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of '61 which I would not have had any knowledge of because I was not involved in Cuban affairs until, as I told,you, early February 1962.

Mr. Baron. The same would go for the shooting of a bazooka towards the Presidential Palace?

Mr. Halley. I have no knowledge.

Mr. Baron. Do you have any knowledge of any efforts to assassinate Fidel Castro run out of Guantanamo Bay Naval Base?

Mr. Halley. No, I do not. As you know, Guantanamo had a number of Cuban exiles in it, people who had taken refuge in the base at one time or another. During the time that I was the Station Chief in Miami we did have contacts with people at Guantanamo. We did use them for intelligence collection purposes, but I do not have any linkage between that intelligence project and assassination.

Mr. Baron. Were paramilitary operations run out of Guantanamo Bay?

Mr. Halley. They were not during my time as Station Chief in Miami by CIA. There was an office of ONI, Office of Naval Intelligence representative on Guantanamo. I have no knowledge of what they may have been doing during various periods of time. I am talking about CIA.

Mr. Baron. Any other names that struck a chord with you in this report?

Mr. Halley. Well, you have a name here, Mario Salabarria

Aquiar; that name rings a bell with me, for what reason, I do not know. You know, we would have to run a name trace to get a rundown of what is in the files and what is in the central index for me to be able to comment on it. As I told you earlier I know that the Agency is doing all these traces after they are completed and you get them and you want me to take a look at it, I will be glad to do so. It may trigger some response.

This name, Ramon Grau Scerio, it rings a bell with me. It is quite possible that he may have been a collection agent, just as is written here. I am making a deduction, but again, I would have to look at the name traces, but it is a name that rings a bell with me.

Mr. Baron. You do not remember him in connection with an attempt to poison the Prime Minister in June of 1965 as it says there?

Mr. Halley. No, I do not.

Then the next name that is on here, that is familiar. Here is one that we discussed, that is AMLASH-1. We already went over that one.

The other name was Manuel Artime, whom we have talked about.

Mr. Baron. Right.

Mr. Baron. The last name on here -- I cannot find it -- the other name is Antonio Cuesta Valle. I cannot find it now, but that is the last name that rang a bell.

Mr. Baron. Do you have any recollection of Cuesta Valle's specific activities with the CIA?

Mr. Halley. No. I would have to run traces on him and take a look at what the information is.

Mr. Baron. Was Frank Sturgis connected with the JMWAVE Station?

Mr. Halley. He was not.

Mr. Baron. Not under the name of Frank Fiorino either?

Mr. Halley. No, he was not. This is again one of these great myths. At this whole Cuba thing, Frank Sturgis was a soldier of fortune, was constantly involved on the periphery of the Cuban exile community. He was involved in free lance operations against Cuba. He was somebody that the FBI, Customs, CIA, everybody, reported on. He was a household name, but he was not on the CIA payroll during the period that I was involved in Cuban affairs, that is the payroll of the Miami Station. I remember name traces being run on this guy and so forth, and the Agency had no contact with him during that period of time.

Mr. Baron. Are you aware of his ever having been on the payroll of the CIA?

Mr. Halley. I personally am not aware of it, and I think, you know, if you had gone to the Agency that they must have given you all sorts of traces on this fellow and told you the same thing.

Mr. Baron. Are you aware of the AMOT program?

Mr. Halley. Yes, I am.

Mr. Baron. How was that spelled?

Mr. Halley. AMOT.

Mr. Baron. What was that program?

Mr. Halley. That was a program involving a Cuban emigre group that was used as an operational support mechanism to support the Miami Station.

Mr. Baron. What kind of support did they provide?

Mr. Halley. They were interviewers of refugees who came out of Cuba. They provided translator personnel to translate the Spanish language publications that were of interest to us. They provided information on the various mainstream activities that were going on in the Cuban exile community.

Mr. Baron. Did they provide support for paramilitary operations against Cuba?

Mr. Halley. They might have identified people whom they thought we should interview or look to or see if they would fit into other paramilitary programs. In other words, they had the contacts in the Cuban community. Say we had a requirement for a diesel engineer. We would say to the AMOT organization, we would say we are looking for a Cuban who is a diesel engineer who has a first engine's license, and they would go through all of their contacts until they would come up with one, a week or ten days or whatever, having identified

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the fellow, where he was, what he was doing. We would then send somebody around to talk to him independant of them and pick him up to work for us in our maritime activities.

It was that kind of operational support.

Mr. Baron. People who were part of this program were not used as paramilitary operatives, at least insofar as they operated under the aegis of this program. There were some of them who may have been in the paramilitary program and then left it and were subsequently picked up in the AMOT organization.

Could we go off the record for a moment?

(Discussion off the record.)

tape 7

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Mr. Halley. We are now back on the record.

The AMOTs also worked with us on a common project, which was monitoring Cuban naval traffic, things like that, so they were used across the board for operational support tasks.

Mr. Baron. One more general question.

Did the JMWAVE Station have an operational relationship with the FBI?

Mr. Halley. I would not --

Mr. Baron. Was the FBI involved in supporting your activities in any way?

Mr. Halley. I would rather phrase that in my language, because I think --

Mr. Baron. Go right ahead.

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Mr. Halley. I do not know if your question means the same thing to me. I would prefer to say we had a liaison relationship with the FBI, that is, on matters dealing with counter-intelligence matters. There was a regular exchange of data with the FBI. There was an exchange of name traces on people that they were conducting investigations on, for counterintelligence purposes, We would trace certain individuals and with the FBI there were a couple of counterintelligence cases that we discovered that were turned over to the FBI.

So this is in the context of the normal CIA-FBI liaison that existed between the two agencies.

Mr. Baron. But the FBI was not involved in supporting paramilitary commando raids to the shore of Cuba, is that correct?

Mr. Halley. I do not know what you are driving at there. I am having a little trouble with that. Are you saying that the FBI dispatched paramilitary teams to Cuba as an organization?

Mr. Baron. Were they involved in paramilitary training of any of the CIA operatives?

Mr. Halley. No. The FBI did not train any CIA personnel during my tenure in the Miami Station.

Mr. Baron. Did the FBI at any point provide with you links to people who had gambling interests inside Cuba?

Mr. Halley. No. We covered the gambling thing previously.

The one case that I mentioned is this man who gave us the lead of the two Soviets from the missile site, and that did not come to the Miami Station through the FBI.

Mr. Baron. Were you ever made aware of a CIA attempt to secure the aid of a pilot, a Cuban pilot, to arrange for an "accident," to occur to Raul Castro when he flew on a Cuban plane?

Mr. Halley. I read this somewhere in the record in post years, but I was not aware of this at the time, at the time I was in Miami.

Mr. Baron. Were you aware that serious consideration had been given to the tactic of assassination at CIA Headquarters during your period of involvement with Cuban affairs?

Mr. Halley. No, that is in the period 1962 to '65 when I was the Station Chief in Miami, I was not aware of any serious you know, program operational effort towards assassinating Castro.

Mr. Baron. Were you aware that serious consideration had been given to the tactic or to the use of the tool of assassination at CIA Headquarters prior to your coming on as JMWAVE Station Chief?

Mr. Halley. No, I was not aware of any, you know, planned program effort at assassination.

Mr. Baron. If we limit it --

Mr. diGenova. What do you mean when you say that?

Mr. Halley. I went through this before before you came in and explained to Mr. Baron that the subject of assassination was constantly being discussed in the Cuban community and was a part of the fabric of the times.

Mr. diGenova. That I am aware of. You are not the only one who has expressed that knowledge that they were all saying let's kill him, let's get together.

Mr. Halley. There was a lot of discussion of this kind of subject of assassination and that is why I keep trying to be precise that there was no programmatic operational program that I was aware of to assassinate Castro.

Mr. Baron. Although the context in which we discussed the talk that was in the air of assassinating Castro was coffee shops in Miami and conversation among Cubans as opposed to conversations among high CIA officials back in Headquarters, were you aware that there were at least serious discussions of the use of assassination against Castro at CIA Headquarters?

Mr. Halley. No, I was not. We are plowing the same ground that we covered before in this.

As I indicated to you, people would come out of Cuba and discuss these kinds of things. Some of these were reported in, you know, traffic back to Washington. People would discuss what are the prospects of somebody assigned to assassinate Castro. In that particular context, yes, discussions on the assassination of Castro took place. That is why I keep coming

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back, if you are saying that if anybody outlined an operational plan to me, did I help construct the plan, did I make a contribution to a plan, my answer is again no. We talked earlier, you asked me about those exploding sea shells of which I said I had never heard of but I had heard discussions of Castro's vulnerability because he was a scuba diver. And you asked me about bacteria, I said I had never heard of an introduction of bacteria, but I had heard again about Castro's vulnerability in this context. Where I heard it, as I told you before, I do not remember.

Mr. Baron. I realize we are plowing some of the same furroughs again. I am trying to be meticulous in the way you were before. You just now said that the subject of assassination probably came up in the context of discussing the contingencies of Castro's death. Did it come up in terms of discussing whether or not a plan should be put together to assassinate Castro, whether or not an operation should be mounted --

Mr. Halley. I cannot recall any such discussion, but in any state where there is a leadership dominated by one man, it is always a discussion of succession. That question has come up, you know, if something happened to Fidel Castro, if he is thrown over, if he does something foolish himself or if somebody is successful in assassinating him, somebody who decides suddenly to take his machetti and just get out in the sugar cane field, again, the question was, who replaces Castro, and we

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generally focused on Raul. There was talk of a collective leadership.

These are all kinds of things that are always done against that kind of a one-man state, whether it is, you know, a Communist state or whatever you want to talk, call it a military dictatorship or a dictatorship of the Right or the Left.

Mr. Baron. Again, discussion of what to do upon the contingency that Castro dies, by whatever means --

Mr. Halley. Non-Agency induced.

Mr. Baron. As opposed to this, which is my question: were you aware of any kind of a discussion at CIA Headquarters on whether or not the CIA should induce the death of Fidel Castro?

Mr. Halley. I do not recall any such discussion. That is why I have gone into all this background to try to explain the mood of the times and that is why I keep referring to, in my sense of the word, as a professional intelligence officer, of an operational plan, I was not a participant in any discussion in which an operational plan for the assassination of Castro was discussed. That is, I think, the heart of the matter.

Mr. Baron. I have no further questions.

Joe, do you have any?

Mr. diGenova. Mr. Halley, who was your immediate superior

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in terms of reporting from Miami?

Mr. Halley. Could we go off the record?

(Discussion off the record.)

Mr. diGenova. Mr. Halley, we have just had a brief discussion here about some of the things that were covered before I arrived by Mr. Baron and you. I do not want to cover any more of that ground.

It is my understanding in discussing the structure of JMWAVE's relationship with Headquarters, General Lansdale's name came up, and that on one occasion, General Lansdale actually came down to Miami to visit the Station to get firsthand knowledge of what was transpiring. Is that correct?

Mr. Halley. That is correct.

Mr. diGenova. Do you have any idea when that was?

Mr. Halley. No. I stated earlier it was in 1962. It probably was in the summer of 1962 because it was after my family arrived in Miami. I do not remember the exact dates. It could be established probably from records of the Agency. I do not recall it specifically.

Mr. diGenova. To your knowledge, did he travel by himself or was he with compatriots or aides?

Mr. Halley. My recollection of that was that he came down on a special airplane. There may have been other people on the plane with him, I do not recall, but he landed at Homestead Air Force Base. As I recall, we picked him up from there.

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Mr. diGenova. Did General Lansdale travel under his own name or under a cover name?

Mr. Halley. Throughout the time that he was in contact with me and the Station he was operating as General Lansdale.

Mr. diGenova. Did he have contact when he was there with some of the assets themselves?

Mr. Halley. He had no contact with any Cubans that I am aware of. He did spend the night that he came down with some friends at Homestead Air Force Base, but I do not recall, I would have no way of knowing what he did that evening.

Mr. diGenova. For the time that he was at JMWAVE he was with officials such as yourself who had a supervisory capacity at JMWAVE Station?

Mr. Halley. That is correct.

Mr. diGenova. I have no further questions.

Mr. Baron. On the record, I just want to thank you for your testimony here today. It has been a long day and we have gone over a lot of things quite carefully and it has been most informative.

I would also like to ask you, if you would, to pursue for us that one name of the man who was connected with gambling interests in Cuba and supplied some intelligence to JMWAVE Station.

(Discussion off the record.)

(Whereupon, at 5:00 o'clock the hearing was concluded.)

HALLEY EXHIBIT

believed he was being supported by U.S. businessmen with financial stakes in Cuba. Roselli needed Giancana and Trafficante in the first phase as a means of establishing contacts inside Cuba. He did not need them in the second phase, because he had Varona. However, it would be naive to assume that Roselli did not take the precaution of informing higher-ups in the syndicate that he was working in a territory considered to be the private domain of someone else in the syndicate.)

When the pills were given to Varona through Roselli, Varona requested arms and equipment needed for the support of his end of the operation. Roselli passed the request to Harvey. Harvey, with the help of Ted Shackley, the chief of the JMWAVE Station, procured explosives, detonators, twenty .30 caliber rifles, twenty .45 caliber hand guns, two radios, and one boat radar. Harvey says that the "shopping list" included some items that could be obtained only from the U.S. Government. Harvey omitted those items, because Roselli, posing as a representative of private business interests, would not have had access to such equipment. The cost of the arms and equipment, about $5,000, was T/A'd to headquarters.

Harvey and Shackley rented a U-Haul truck under an assumed name, loaded it with the arms and equipment, and parked it in the parking lot of a drive-in restaurant. The keys were then given to Roselli for

delivery either to Maceo, to Varona, or to Varona's son-in-law. Evidently Harvey and Roselli had not yet come to trust each other. Perhaps fearing a double-cross, each set about independently to assure himself that the equipment reached the proper hands. After parking the truck, Harvey and Shackley kept the parking lot under surveillance until the pass was completed. Roselli, accompanied by O'Connell, did the same. Neither pair knew that the other was watching. Eventually the truck was picked up and driven away. It was returned later, empty, and with the keys under the seat as prearranged. Harvey returned it to the rental agency. Harvey says that Shackley never knew to whom delivery was made nor for what purpose. Shackley was merely called upon to furnish support for a headquarters operation from which he was otherwise excluded.

May 1962

Harvey and Roselli arranged a system of telephone communication by which Harvey was kept posted on any developments. Harvey, using a pay phone, could call Roselli at the Friars Club in Los Angeles at 1600 hours, Los Angeles time. Roselli could phone Harvey at Harvey's home in the evening. Roselli reported that the pills were in Cuba and at the restaurant reportedly used regularly by Castro.

La Agencia Central de Inteligencia(CIA)
de Estados Unidos, ha jugado el papel --
principal en la historia de las agresio
nes contra Cuba, promoviendo, organizan
do, financiando y en muchos casos diri-
giendo acciones vandálicas, no sólo con
tra el territorio cubano sino también -
contra nuestras representaciones e inte
reses en países extranjeros o en aguas-
internacionales.

En esta amplia gama de actividades des-
plegadas por la CIA, y demás órganos --
subversivos de Estados Unidos contra --
nuestro país, se destacan por su peli--
grosidad, los reiterados planes dirigi-
dos a la eliminación física de los prin
cipales dirigentes de la Revolución y,-
en especial, contra la figura de nuestro
Primer Ministro.

Las pruebas que aportamos evidencian --
que, desde 1959, éste ha sido uno de sus
objetivos principales, mediante el em--
pleo de los más variados métodos técni-
cos de precisión.En los casos de agen--
tes radicados en el exterior, les han -
facilitado medios de traslación y comu-
nicación.

The United States Central Intelligence Agency
(CIA) has played the leading role in the his-
tory of the agressions against Cuba,promoting,
organizing, financing, and, in many cases,---
directing vandalic actions, not only against-
the Cuban territory, but also against our ---
representations and interest in foreign coun-
tries, or in international waters.

In this wide variety of activities carried --
out by the CIA and by other United States ---
subversive bodies against our country ,the ---
reiterated plans toward the physical elimina-
tion, of the principal leaders of the Revolu-
tion, and specially, against our Prime Minis
ter, stand out because of their dangerousness.

The proofs we provide, evidence that, since -
1959, this has been one of its major aims, by
using the most varied technical precision ---
methods. In the case of agents living abroad,
they have been given means of transportation-
and communication.

(2)

Es de destacar que en las innumerables- infiltraciones organizadas por la CIA,- utilizando miembros de organizaciones - contrarrevolucionarias, uno de los obje tivos constantes ha sido también la eli minación física del Comandante en Jefe- Fidel Castro Ruz.

La CIA, para la ejecución de sus planes, ha utilizado elementos contrarrevolucio narios en el interior y exterior del -- país. No sólo ha tenido como colaborado- res a los desplazados del poder, sino - también a elementos de distinta proce-- dencia social, incluyendo a exponentes- de todo tipo de lacras.

Igualmente, no han tenido reparo en re- clutar a destacados jefes y elementos - de la maffia norteamericana, a quienes- les han conmutado fechorías a cambio de su participación en los planes de aten- tado contra nuestros dirigentes.

No han vacilado tampoco en tratar de -- ejecutar sus acciones en lugares públi- cos, donde el número de víctimas inocen tes hubiese sido incalculable, como fue ron: los atentados planificados en el - Stadium Latinoamericano, Plaza de la Re

It is worth noticing that, in the innumerable infiltrations organized by the CIA, using --- members of counterrevolutionary organizations, one of the permanent goals has also been the- physical elimination of Commander in Chief,- Fidel Castro Ruz.

The CIA, in orden to carry out its plans, has- used counterrevolutionary individuals inside- and outside the country. It has had as colla- borators, not only those who had been shifted fron power, but also individuals of different social origins, including samples of all types of viciousness.

In the same way, they have had no objection - to recruting well-known leaders and members- from the American maffia, to whom they have - barred their offences, in exchange for their- participation in the plots against our leaders.

Nor have they hesitated in trying to carry -- out their actions in public places, where the number of innocent victims would have been -- incalculable, as were the crimes planned to - take place at the Latin American Stadium, the Revolution Square and the University of Ha--

(3)

Durante los últimos meses, la prensa nor-
teamericana ha publicado una creciente y-
amplia información sobre la realización -
de estas actividades, ofreciendo en deta-
lles la participación de la Agencia Cen--
tral de Inteligencia en la elaboración y-
ejecución de los planes de atentado.

En los informes rendidos por la llamada -
Comisión Rockefeller y la presidida por -
el senador Frank Church, para las investi
gaciones sobre las actividades ilegales -
de la CIA, ha quedado demostrado de forma
categórica lo antes expuesto.

Un ex-agente hizo públicas declaraciones-
sobre la participación de dicha agencia -
en el criminal atentado perpetrado contra
el vapor francés "La Coubre", donde más -
de un centenar de cubanos resultaron muer
tos y alrededor de 200, heridos graves.

Brinda detalles pormenorizados sobre su -
realización, tratando de "justificar" esta
matanza por un desperfecto en el mecanis-
mo del equipo explosivo utilizado.

During the last month, the American press has published an increasing and extensive informa tion about the accomplishment of these acti- vities, offering details about the participa tion of the Central Intelligence Agency in - the elaboration and execution of the crimi-- nal plans.

In the reports of the so-called Rockefeller- Commission, as well as the one headed by --- Senator Frank Church, for the researches on - the illegal activities of the Central Intelli gence Agenci (CIA), all that we have stated- above, has been undoubtedly demonstrated.

A former agent made public statements about- the participation of this Agency in the cri- minal act carried out against the French --- steamship "La Coubre", where more than one -- hundred Cubans were killed and about 200, -- were seriously injured. He offers details -- about his accomplisments trying to "justify"- this killing by blaming a slight damage in - the mechanism of the blowing equipment which was used.

(4)

Resulta significativa la información ---
aportada por el columnista Jack Anderson
en el diario "The Washington Post" sobre
la intervención del ganster John Rosselli
en varios planes de atentados contra el-
Primer Ministro Fidel Castro, algunos de
ellos mediante envenenamiento con pasti-
llas entregadas por la CIA. Posteriormen
te, según la propia prensa norteamerica-
na, Rosselli admitió ante la Comisión de
Inteligencia del Senado su participación
con esta Agencia en varios complots para
asesinar al Primer Ministro Cubano.

Paulatinamente, funcionarios, senadores,
jefes, oficiales y ex-agentes de la CIA,
así como conocidos columnistas de la ---
prensa norteamericana, han hecho categó-
ricas declaraciones, que coinciden con -
las denuncias formuladas, oportunamente -
por el gobierno de Cuba.

Sin pretender relacionar todos los pla--
nes de atentados fraguados, exponemos a-
continuación algunos casos, que en su --
casi totalidad no han sido de conocimien
to público y prueban la diversidad y rei
teración de la participación de la CIA y
otras agencias subversivas en estos he--

Very significant is the information given by-
the journalist Jack Anderson from "The Washing
ton Post" about the gangster John Rosselli's-
participation in various plots against Prime-
Minister Fidel Castro, somo of them by means-
of poisoning, with pills handed to him by the
CIA. Afterwards, according to the American --
press itself, Rosselli, before the Senate ---
Intelligence Commission, conceded having parti
cipated with this Agency in various plots for
assassinating the Cuban Prime Minister.

Gradually, officials, Senators, chiefs, offi-
cers and former CIA agents, as well as well -
known American press press journalists, have-
made categorical statements, which coincide--
with the denounces expressed, apropos, by the-
Cuban Government.

Without pretending to mention all the plots--
attempted, we expose some of them the majority
of which have not been publicly known.
They prove the diversity and recurrence of --
the CIA as well as other subversive agencies
participation in these actions:

(5)

A mediados del año 1960, los elementos contrarrevolucionarios Armando Cubría Ramos y Mario Tauler Sagué, miembros de la organización contrarrevolucionaria "La Cruz", se infiltraron por la zona de Punta de Hicacos, Matanzas.

Tauler Sagué, elemento gansteril, junto a Cubría Ramos traían la misión de realizar un atentado a nuestro Primer Ministro, así como perpetrar distintas acciones de sabotaje y terrorismo. Para cumplirla fueron pertrechados por la CIA de gran cantidad de material bélico y equipos, los que fueron ocupados al ser detenidos.

In mid 1960, the counterrevolutionary Armando Cubría Ramos and Mario Tauler Sague, members of the "La Cruz" counterrevolutionary organization, were infiltrated through the Punta Hicacos zone, in Matanzas Province.

Tauler Sagué, a gangster, together with Cubría Ramos, were instructed to carry out a plot against our Prime Minister, as well as to commit various sabotage and terrorism actions. For accomplishing this, they were given great quantity of warlike material and equipment by the CIA, which were taken from them when arrested.

6

El traidor Humberto Sorí Marín, con cuatro contrarrevolucionarios más, se infiltraron en marzo de 1961, por la costa norte de La Habana con el objetivo de reagrupar a las organizaciones contrarrevolucionarias, realizar un atentado al Comandante en Jefe y desarrollar todo tipo de actividades subversivas para apoyar la invasión de Playa Girón.

Para tales fines fueron entrenados y armados por la CIA, ocupándoseles gran cantidad de material bélico y otros equipos al ser detenidos.

Entre los principales encartados figuraban: Rogelio González Corcho, Manuel Lorenzo Puig Millán, Nemesio Rodríguez Navarrete, Gaspar Domínguez Trueba Varona, Eufemio J. Fernandez Ortega y Rafael Díaz Hanscons, responsables de diversos grupos y organizaciones contrarrevolucionarias dirigidas por la CIA.

The traitor Humberto Sorí Marín with four other counterrevolutionaries, were infiltrated in --- March 1961, through the north coast of Havana, - with the purpose of grouping the counterrevolutionary organizations, of carrying out the ---- assassination of Commander in Chief and of developing all type of subversive activities in --- order tu support the Playa Girón invasion.

For this purpose, they were trained and armed-- by the Central Intelligence Agency. A great --- quantity of warlike material and other equipment were taken from them when arrested.

Among the participants were Rogelio González Corcho, Manuel Lorenzo Puig Millán, Nemesio Rodríguez Navarrete, Gaspar Domínguez Trueba Varona, - Eufemio J. Fernández Ortega and Rafael Díaz Hanscons, heads of various counterrevolutionary ---- groups and organization directed by the CIA.

(7)

En junio de 1961, se celebra una reunión con la asistencia de un elemento infil-- trado en Cuba por la organización contra revolucionaria "Frente Revolucionario De mocrático"(FRD), quien traía la orden de realizar un atentado al Comandante en Je fe Fidel Castro Ruz.

Para ejecutar dicha acción fueron desig- nados: Juan Basigalupe Hornedo, Higinio- Menéndez Beltrán, Guillermo Coula Ferrer y otros, entregándoseles dinero para su- fragar los gastos de la operación.

El plan consistía en situar dos jeeps -- con bazookas en el garage, sito en las - Avenidas de R.ncho Boyeros y Santa Cata- lina, y un panel por la Ciudad Deportiva, con hombres portando granadas. Al pasar- nuestro dirigente obstaculizarían el --- tránsito, abriendo fuego.

Al ser detenidos, Guillermo Coula Ferrer e Higinio Menéndez acusaron a la CIA de- ser el principal director del plan. Los- encartados mantenían contactos a través- de la Base Naval de Guantánamo y la Emba jada Suiza, con miembros de la CIA y auto ridades norteamericanas, quienes les pro

In June 1961, a meeting was celebrated with the attendance of an individual infiltrated in Cuba by the "Frente Revolucionario Demo- crático"(FRD) counterrevolutionary organita tion, who was instructed to carry out a --- a plot against Commander in Chief Fidel Cas tro Ruz.

To accomplish this action, Juan Basigalupe - Hornedo, Higinio Menéndez Beltrán, Guillermo Coula Ferrer and others were appointed, and they were given money to meet the expensės - of the operation.

The plan was to place two jeeps with bazookas in the garage which is at Rancho Boyeros and Santa Catalina Avenues, and a light truck at the Ciudad Deportiva(Sports City) with men - carrying grenades. When our leaders would -- pass by, they would ~~our~~ stop the traffic and open fire.

When they were arrested, Guillermo Caula Fe- rrer and Higinio Menéndez accused the CIA of being the principal director of the plot. The indicted kept contacts through Guantánamo Naval Base and the Swiss Embassy, with members of the CIA and American authorities, who gave them means and instructions to carry out ---

(8)

Después del descalabro de Playa Girón, la Agencia Central de Inteligencia continuó sus actividades subversivas contra nuestro país, iniciando el reagrupamiento de las dispersas organizaciones contrarrevolucionarias bajo la organización "Unidad Resistencia".

Esa labor fue llevada a cabo por los agentes de la CIA infiltrados: Emilio Adolfo Rivero Caro(Brand), Adolfo Mendoza (Raúl) y Jorge García Rubio(Tony) entre otros. Seguidamente se dieron a la tarea de desarrollar todo tipo de actividades subversivas, incluyendo un atentado contra el Comandante de División Raúl Castro Ruz durante el desarrollo del acto provincial del 26 de julio de 1961 en Oriente; la autoagresión a la Base Naval de Guantánamo, con el fin de justificar la agresión por parte de las Fuerzas Armadas norteamericanas; así como ataques a las repúblicas cercanas para provocar un conflicto internacional.

Los planes contemplan también un atentado contra el Comandante en Jefe en el acto central de la misma fecha en la Plaza-

After the Playa Girón defeat, the Central Intelligence Agency continued its subversive activities against our country, starting the prouping of the disperse counterrevolutionary organization, under the "Unidad Resistencia" organization.

This task was carried out by the infiltrated CIA agents Emilio Adolfo Rivero Caro (Brand), Adolfo Mendoza (Raúl) and Jorge García Rubio (Tony) among others. Afterwards, they tried to develop all types of subversive activities, including a plot against Division Commander(Lieutenant Colonel) Raúl Castro Ruz, during the provincial celebration of the 26 de July at Oriente Province in 1961; the selfaggression to Guantánamo Naval Base, with the purpose of justifying the aggression by the American Armed Forces, as well as attacks to neghbor republics, in order to provoke an international conflict.

The plans included also a plot against the Commander in Chief, during the central rally the same day, at the Revolution ----

(9)

de la Revolución, para lo cual fue a coordinar en territorio de Estados Unidos el contrarrevolucionario José Pujals Mederos, quien salió clandestinamente hacia ese -- país. Allí se entrevistó con los oficiales de la CIA, Jim Bender, conocido por Jim Boulding, Harold Bishop y Carl Hitch. En esta entrevista Mederos fue nombrado jefe de - los oficiales de la CIA que operaban en - Cuba, en sustitución de Alfredo Izaguirre conocido por Tito, que estaba detenido.

En la Base Naval de Guantánamo se llevaron a cabo las reuniones conspirativas, y sus autoridades (Capitán Schenweias) proporcionaron gran cantidad de material bélico y equipos para la realización de estos -- planes.

El mencionado Capitán Carl.E.Schenweias, ex jefe de la Base Naval, fue uno de los más activos organizadores de las agresiones.

Detenidos todos los encartados, se les ocupó gran cantidad de material y equipos bélicos.

Es de significar, que todos estos planes - subversivos fueron denunciados oportunamente por el Comandante Ernesto Guevara - en Punta del Este.

Square. For this purpose, the counterrevolutionary José Pujals Mederos made an under - cover visit to the United States, in order to coordinate this action. There, he met -- CIA officers Jim Bender, known as Jim Boulding, Harold Bischop and Carl Hitch. During this meeting, Mederos was appointed chief - of the CIA officers, who opperated in Cuba, substituting Aldredo Izaguirre, known as -- Tito, who was arrested.

The conspiratory meeting were carried out -- at the Guantánamo Naval Base, and its ----- authorities (Captain Schenweias) supplied a lot of warlike material and equipment for - the accomplishment of these plans.

The mentioned Captain Carl.E.Schenweias, - formes chief of the Naval Base, was one of the most active organizers of the aggressions.

When all the indicated were arrested, a -- great number of warlike material and equipment was taken from them.

It is worth noticing that all these subversive plans were denounced opportunely, by - Commander Ernesto Guevara, at Punta del -- Este.

(10)

En la segunda quincena de julio de 1961,un grupo de elementos contrarrevolucionarios- de las organizaciones"30 de Noviembre","Movimiento Revolucionario del Pueblo" y"Frente Revolucionario Democrático", planeaban-atentar contra nuestro Comandante en Jefe- y otros dirigentes.

Recibían orientaciones de la CIA a través- de contactos con Tony Varona,Manuel Ray y- Aureliano Sánchez Arango en el exterior -- del país, y con el Almirante Burke y agentes de la CIA en la Base Naval de Guantánamo. El atentado se efectuaría en las cercanías del domicilio de la compañera Celia - Sánchez Manduley, en el Vedado. Resultaron detenidos Mario Chanez de Armas,Francisco-Chanez de Armas, Roberto Coscuyuela Val---cárcel, Orlando Ulacia Valdés, Francisco - Gil Cruz, Segundo González González y ---- otros, a quienes se les ocuparon armas y - explosivos.

During the second fortnight of July,1961,a group of counterrevolutionaries from "30 - de Noviembre", "Movimiento Revolucionario-del Pueblo" and "Frente Revolucionario Democrático" organizations, were plotting -- against our Commander in Chief and other-- leaders.

They received CIA instructions through --- contacts abroad with Tony Varona, Manuel - Ray and Aureliano Sánchez Arango, and with Admiral Burke and CIA agents in Guantánamo Naval Base. The plot would be carried out- in the proximity of Celia Sánchez Manduley's house, in Vedado. Mario Chanez de Armas, Francisco Chanez de Armas, Roberto -- Coscuyuela Valcárcel, Orlando Ulacia Valdés, Francisco Gil Cruz, Segundo González-González and others were arrested and ---- weapons and explosives were taken from --- them.

(11)

Entre sus planes figuraba también el fracasado atentado al Dr.Carlos Rafael Rodríguez llevado a efecto el 13 de setiembre de 1961 cuando dicho dirigente regresaba de Matanzas hacia La Habana. Con ese fin, un grupo de contrarrevolucionarios pertenecientes a las organizaciones antes mencionadas, establecieron contactos con representantes del "Movimiento de Recuperación Revolucionaria" (MRR). Al frente de los mismo se hallaba -- Juan José Martore Silva.

Estos elementos mantenían estrechos vínculos con un agente de la CIA, así como con un jefe de bandidos en la provincia de Matanzas. Al resultar detenidos se les ocupó el material bélico que poseían.

Among their plans was also the failed plot against Dr. Carlos Rafael Rodríguez, which was attempted on September 13th,1961, when he was coming back from Matanzas to Havana. With thar purpose, a group of counterrevolutionary individuals,: belonging to the --- organizations mentioned above, contacted -- representatives of the "Movimiento de Recuperación Revolucionaria"(MRR). The group's leader was Juan José Martore Silva.

These individuals kept close relation with a CIA agent as well as with the chief of a band in Matanzas Province. When arrested, warlike material was taken from them.

(12)

En octubre de 1961, las organizaciones con
trarrevolucionarias "II Frente del Escam--
bray" y "Movimiento de Recuperación Revolu
cionaria" (MRR) dirigidas por la Agencia -
Central de Inteligencia (CIA), aprobaron un
plan conjunto de sabotajes en la capital, a
fin de provocar la indignación popular e -
influir sobre la concurrencia masiva al ac
to de recibimiento al Presidente de la Re-
pública, Dr. Osvaldo Dorticós Torrado, a -
su llegada de Punta del Este.

Esta táctica estaba encaminada a viabilizar
el plan de atentado que ejecutarían el día
4 del propio mes, disparando con una bazoo
ka hacia la tribuna situada en la terraza-
del antiguo Palacio Presidencial desde un-
apartemento situado en un edificio conti--
guo. La retirada sería cubierta con el cri
minal lanzamiento de granadas contra el --
público, para crear la confusión y el páni
co.

Sus propósitos fueron frustrados al ser de
tenidos todos los encartados, ocupándose --
gran cantidad de material bélico.

On Octuber 1961, "II Frente del Escambray"
and "Movimiento de Recuperación Revolucio-
naria"(MRR) counterrevolutionary organiza-
tions, directed by the Central Intelligence
Agency (CIA), approved a joint plan for a-
sabotage in the capital, in order to cause
people's indignation and to influence on --
the mass gathering to welcome the President
of the Republic Osvaldo Dorticós Torrado,-
on his arrival from Punta del Este.

This tactic was aimed to facilitate the --
plot, which would be carried out on the --
4th of the same month, shooting with a ---
bazooka in direction to the tribune located
on the terrace of the former Presidential
Palace, from an apartament located in a --
nearby building. The withdrawal would be -
covered by the criminal launching of grenades
against the public, in order to cause confu
sion and panic.

Their purposes were frustrated when all
of the indicted were arrested and a great-
number of warlike material was taken from-
them.

(13)

A principios de 1962, siguiendo orientacio-
nes de la CIA y la Base Naval de Guantána-
mo, el contrarrevolucionario Jorge Luis --
Cuervo Calvo se da a la tarea de restructu-
rar algunos grupos y organizaciones contra-
revolucionarias, creando la denominada ---
"Unión de Unidades Revolucionarias"(UDUR).

Cuervo Calvo, Humberto Gómez Peña, Raúl Cay
Hernández, Raúl Cay Gispert y otros se reu-
nieron para elaborar planes de alzamiento-
e informar sobre los contactos estableci--
dos en la Base Naval norteamericana de ---
Guantánamo para recibir material bélico y-
equipos.

La CIA persiste en sus planes de atentar -
contra la vida del Primer Ministro y de --
producir una autoagresión a la Base Naval.
Cumpliendo estas órdenes, el contrarrevo--
lucionario Cuervo Calvo hace contacto con-
la organización DRE, procediendo a elabo--
rar lo que denominaron "Plan Z", que con--
sistía en: atentar contra la vida del Dr.-
Raúl Roa, Ministro de Relaciones Exterio--
res, lo que les permitiría llevar a vías -
de hecho otro atentado de mayor proporcio-
nes contra el Primer Ministro y demás diri-
gentes de la Revolución que concurrieran -
al sepelio.

In early 1962, following instructions from
the CIA and the Guantánamo Naval Base, the
counterrevolutionary Jorge Luis Cuervo Cal-
vo reorganized several group and counter--
revolutionary organizations, and created -
the "Unión de Unidades Revolucionarias" --
(UDUR).

Cuervo Calvo, Humberto Gómez Peña, Raúl --
Cay Hernández, Raúl Cay Gispert and others
met in order to prepare plans for uprising
and inform about the contacts established-
with the Guantánamo Naval Base for receiving
warlike material and equipment.

The Central Intelligence Agency insisted -
on its plots against the Prime Minister's-
life, and to carry out a self-aggression -
to the Naval Base. Following these instruc-
tions, the counterrevolutionary Cuervo ---
Calvo made contacts with the DRE organiza-
tion, and elaborated what would be known -
as "Plan Z", which consisted on attempt---
ing against the life of the Minister of --
Foreign Relations Raúl Roa, what would ---
enable them to carry out another plot of -
bigger proportions agains the Prime Minister
and other revolucionary leaders who would-
attend the burial.

(14)

Es de destacar que los autores intelectuales de este plan fueron los contrarevolucionarios Cay Hernández y Cay -- Gispert, militantes de la organización DRE, que era dirigida por el agente de la CIA, infiltrado en nuestro país, Julio Hernández Rojo.

It is worth noticing that the intellectual authors of this plan were the counter----- revolutionaries Cay Hernández y Cay Gis--- pert, members of the DRE organization, --- which was headed by Julio Hernández Rojo,- a CIA agent infiltrated into our country.

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(15)

La organización "Resistencia Cívica Anticomunista"(RCA) en cuyo seno se agruparon el "Ejército de Liberación Nacional"(ELN) "Movimiento de Recuperación Revolucionaria"(MRR), "Agrupación Montecristi", y -- otros, era dirigida desde el exterior por la CIA, a través de su agente Nino Díaz.

En 1963, la CIA orientó al bloque RCA organizar y ejecutar acciones internas que aparentaran la existencia de una resistencia popular activa, con vista a solicitar la intervención armada a Cuba, en la reunión de Presidentes de países miembros de la OEA.

Las instrucciones eran suministradas por la CIA a través de la Base Naval de Guantánamo. A partir de entonces la RCA elabora nuevos planes de acción y atentados, en apoyo a la invasión armada que esperaban en el mes de julio.

Con motivo de los actos conmemorativos -- del 13 de Marzo, planearon asesinar al -- Comandante en Jefe, desde una casa cercana a la Universidad de la Habana, disparando hacia la tribuna, con un mortero. Los principales encartados fueron Samuel Car-

The "Resistencia Cívica Anticomunista"---- organization (RCA), to which "Ejército de Liberación Nacional"(ELN), "Movimiento de Recuperación Revolucionaria"(MRR), "Agrupación Montecristi" and others were joined, was directed from abroad by the CIA, through its agent Nino Díaz.

In 1963, the CIA gave instructions to the RCA block for organizing and carrying out internal actions in order to give the ---- impression of the existence of a popular -- civic resistence, and therefore, demanding - an armed intervention in Cuba, at the ---- meeting of the Presidents of countries ---- members of the OAS.

The instructions were given by the CIA ---- through Guantánamo Naval Base. Since then, the RCA elaborated new plans for actions -- and crimes, for supporting the armed invasion which was expected in July.

On the occasion of the acts conmmemrating - the 13th of March, they plan-ed to assesinate the Commander in Chief, from a house near -- the University of Havana, shooting with a -- mortar in direction to the tribune. The --- principal persons indicted were Samuel Car-

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ballo Moreno (agente de la CIA, Luis David Rodríguez González, Ricardo Olmedo-Moreno, José A. López Rodríguez, Juan - Lucio Morales Sosa y otros.

Simultáneamente al atentado proyectaron ataques a locales de los Comités de Defensa de la Revolución y Milicias Nacionales Revolucionarias.

ballo Moreno CIA agent), Luis David Rodríguez González, Ricardo Olmedo Moreno, José A. López Rodríguez, Juan Lucio Morales -- Sosa and others.

Simultaneously with this plot, attacks to the Committees of Defense of the Revolu-- tion and the National Revolutionary Militias sites, were planned to be carried -- out.

(17)

Ante el fracaso, la RCA elabora un -- nuevo plan contra el Primer Ministro, esta vez en el stadium Latinoamericano el 7 de abril de 1963.En el mismo participarían 16 hombres armados de pistolas y granadas de fragmentación.

Entre los principales encartados se encontraban Enrique Rodríguez Valdés-conocido por "Mulgado",Ricardo López-Cabrera, Onorio Torres Perdomo y Jorge Carlos Espinosa Escarles.

Having failed, the RCA elaborated a new plot against the Prime Minister,this time at the Latin American Stadium on April 7th, 1963. Sixteen men armed with pistols and fragmentation grenades would participate in it.

Among the principal persons indicted were- Enrique Rodríguez Valdés, known as"Mülgado" Ricardo López Cabrera, Onorio Torres Perdomo and Jorge Carlos Espinosa Escarles.

(18)

Elaboraron otro plan, esta vez contra la vida del Ministro de las Fuerzas Armadas Comandante de División Raúl Castro Ruz,- en la Plaza de la Revolución, con motivo de la celebración del 26 de Julio. En el- mismo tomarían parte cuatro grupos dirigidos por René Sigler Sánchez Evias, Jesús Montes de Oca Cruz, Oscar Sibila Soria y Eliecer Rodríguez Suárez. El jefe- de estos grupos era Ibrahim Machin Her-- nández.

Todas estas acciones, organizadas y fomentadas por la CIA a través del bloque RCA, fueron frustradas, detenidos sus encartados y ocupadas gran cantidad de armas y- equipos.

They elaborated another plot, this time ---- against the life of the Minister of the --- Armed Forces, División Commander(Lieutenant Colonel) Raúl Castro Ruz, at the Revolution Square, during the celebration of the 26th- of July. Four groups leaded by René Sigler- Sánchez Evias, Jesús Montes de Oca Cruz, Oscar Sibila Soria and Eliecer Rodríguez Suárez, would participate. The head of these - groups was Ibrahim Machin Hernández.

All these actions, organized and promoted - by the CIA through the RCA block, were ---- frustrated, the persons indicted were - --- arrested and a great number of weapons and- equipment were taken from them.

(19)

Para el 28 de setiembre de 1963, aniversario de los Comités de Defensa de la Revolucion, los contrarrevolucionarios Orlando Martiniano de la Cruz Sánchez, Juan Israel Cazañas León, Jesús Plácido Rodríguez Mosquera, Luis Beltrán Arencibia Pérez, Francisco Vlanco de los Cuetos, Federico Hernández González y otros, vinculados al agente de la CIA Pierre Owen Diez de Ure, prepararon un plan de atentado contra nuestro Primer Ministro.

Estos elementos, agrupados en las organizaciones contrarrevolucionarias "Frente Interno de Unidad Revolucionaria" (FIUR), "Triple A", "Movimiento Democrático Revolucionario" (MDR), "Ejército de Liberación Nacional" (ELN), contaron con el asescramiento y aseguramiento de la CIA.

El plan consistía en dinamitar las conductoras del alcantarillado que pasa por debajo de la tribuna presidencial. Liquidado el plan y detenidos los autores, el agente Pierre Owen Diez de Ure, ciudadano francés residente en nuestro país, confesó que trabajaba para la CIA desde hacía dos años aproximadamente, facilitándole informaciones de diversa índole.

For September the 28th 1963, anniversary of the Committees of Defense of the Revolution, the counterrevolutionary Orlando Martiniano de la Cruz Sánchez, Juan Israel Cazañas León, Jesús Plácido Rodríguez Mosquera, Luis Beltrán Arencibia Pérez, Francisco Vlanco de los Cuetos, Federico Hernándes González and others, related to the CIA agent Pierre Owen Diez de Ure, prepared a plot against our Prime Minister.

These individuals grouped into the "Frente Interno de Unidad Revolucionaria" (FIUR), "Triple A", "Movimiento Democrático Revolucionario" (MDR), "Ejército de Liberación Nacional" (ELN) counterrevolutionary organizations, had CIA advice and support.

The plan was to dynamite the sewage pipes which pass under the presidential tribune. Once the plan frustrated and the authors arrested, the agent Pierre Owen Diez de Ure, French citizen living in our country, confessed that he had been working for the CIA for aproximately two years, and that he had given this Agency information of various sorts.

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En el mes de marzo de 1964, se gestó otro-plan de atentado contra el Comandante en -Jefe. El principal encartado, Mario Salabarría Aguiar, elemento gansteril, mantenía -contactos con la CIA a través del agente -Dr. Bernardo Milanés López, Jefe de una --red, quien pasó la información del plan al Centro CIA y gestionó desde España la ayuda de los apátridas Tony Varona y Juan ---Bosch, amigos de Salabarría.

El plan consistía en instalar una ametra--lladora calibre 30 ó 50 en un vehículo y -aguardar la posibilidad del paso del Comandante en Jefe, para atentar contra su vida. La CIA entregó a Salabarría las armas y medios necesarios, incluyendo grandes sumas-de dinero.

In March 1964, another plot against Commander-in Chief was elaborated. The principal indicted Mario Salabarría Aguiar, a gangster, had con---tacts with the CIA through the agent Dr. Ber--nardo Milanés López head of a net, who informed the CIA center of the plan and sought, from -Spain, the support of Salabarría's friends, Tony Varona and Juan Bosch.

The plan consisted in installing a machine gun caliber 30 or 50 in a vehicle and waiting for-the occasion when the Commander in Chief -----would pass by, in order to attempt against his life. The CIA gave Salabarría the necessary --weapons and means, including great sums of ---money.

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A mediados del año 1964, los contrarrevolucionarios Osvaldo Valentín Figueroa Gálvez, conocido por "Mankeca", Reynaldo Figueroa-Gálvez, Felipe Alonso Herrera y José Manuel Rodríguez Cruz, conocido por "Lolo",-miembros de la organización "Movimiento de Liberación Nacional", que formaba parte -- del bloque de organizaciones, RCA, dirigi--das por la CIA, comienzan a preparar un -- plan de atentado contra el Primer Ministro.

Estos individuos estaban vinculados a los -agentes de la CIA, Alberto y Ramón Grau --- Sierra, quienes formaban parte de la red -- dirigida por Ramón y María Leopoldina Grau-Alsina, que posteriormente-en junio de 1965 intentaron envenenar al Primer Ministro.

El plan consistía en el lanzamiento de granadas contra nuestro Primer Ministro en el-Stadium Latinoamericano, por un grupo de -- nueve hombres, quienes fueron detenidos, y-ocupados los equipos bélicos.

In mid-1964, the counterrevolutionaries Osvaldo Valentín Figueroa Gálvez, known as --- "Mankeca", Reinaldo Figueroa Gálvez, Felipe-Alonso Herrera and José Manuel Rodríguez -Cruz, known as "Lolo" members of the "Movimiento de Liberación Nacional", which be---longed to the RCA block of organizations,-- directed by the CIA, began to prepare a --- plot against the Prime Minister.

These persons were related to the CIA agents Alberto and Ramón Grau Sierra, who belonged to the net headed by Ramón and María Leopoldina Grau Alsina, who latter in June 1965.-attempted to poison the Prime Minister.

The plan consisted on throwing grenades --- against our Prime Minister at the Latin -- American Stadium, by a group of nine men -- who were arrested and whose warlike equip--ment was taken from them.

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En setiembre de ese mismo año(1964), un - grupo de contrarrevolucionarios de las organizaciones "Ejército de Liberación Nacional"(ELN) y "Frente Interno de Liberación"(FIL), que cumplían misiones de obtención de información para la CIA, comenzaron a gestionar la unificación, cumpliendo también órdenes de dicha Agencia.

Enfrascados en estas labores de unidad,el contrarrevolucionario Nemesio Cubillas Pérez, pone en conocimiento de Angel Miguel Arencibia Virán, Rolando Galdós Ranzola y otros el plan de atentado que venían fraguando contra nuestro Primer Ministro en la Calle 11, en el Vedado, orientados por la CIA.

A principios de 1965, los contrarrevolucionarios Julio Omar Cruz Cecilia,Fermín González Carballo y Giraldo Reynaldo Diego Solano, miembros del "Ejército de Liberación Nacional(integrado al bloque de la RCA,dirigida por la CIA) comienzan a ultimar detalles de un plan de atentados contra el Cómandante en Jefe en Santiago de las Vegas.

In september of this same year (1964),a group of counterrevolutionaries from the"Ejército de Liberación Nacional(ELN), and"Frente Interno de Liberación"(FIL) organizations, who were accomplishing instructions of obtaining information for the CIA, began to seek unification, according, to the CIA's orders.

While accomplishing these tasks for archieving unity, the counterrevolutionary Nemesio Cubillas Pérez, informed Angel Miguel - Arencibia Virán, Rolando Galdós Ranzola and others about the plot they were elaborating against our Primer Minister at 11 St.,Vedado, according to the CIA instructions.

At the beginning of 1965, the counterrevolutionaries Julio Omar Cruz Cecilia, Fermín González Carballo and Giraldo Reynaldo Diego Solano, members of the "Ejército de Liberación Nacional(integrated into the RCA -- block, directed by the CIA) began to ----- complete details of a plot against the --- Commander in Chief in Santiago de las Vegas.

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Desisten de esta primera variante y pro--yectan otro plan que sería perpetrado en-el stadium Latincamericano con hombres ar-mados de granadas de fragmentación, y ---otro grupo, apostado en un edificio cerca-no, abriría fuego de ametralladoras con--tra el público para crear el pánico y la-confusión y garantizando así la retirada.

They gave up this first plan and devised another plot, which would be committed -by armed men with fragmentation grenades at the Latin American Stadium, and in a-near building, there was another group--which would open fire with machine guns-against the people producing panic and -confusion and, thus, guaranteeing the --withdrawal.

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En junio de este mismo año- según se ha mencionado anteriormente- una red de agentes - de la CIA, dirigidos por Ramón y María Leopoldina Grau Alsina(conocida por "Polita")- se dedicaba a todo tipo de actividades enemigas y otras de carácter antisocial para - lo cual se valían de contactos con sedes capitalistas en el país, que servían de enlace con la Agencia Central de Inteligencia.

Estos elementos formaban parte de las organizaciones "Rescate", "Movimiento Anticomunista Revolucionario"(MAR) y otras dirigidas y subversionadas por esa Agencia.

María Leopoldina Grau Alsina recibió instrucciones de la CIA de fraguar un plan para envenenar al Primer Ministro Fidel Castro, para lo cual le enviaron un frasco de pastillas venenosas, que fueron entregadas a Alberto Cruz Caso, quien a su vez las entregó a los miembros de la organización(MAR) Jesús Campanioni Souza y Santos de la Caridad Pérez Núñez, para que efectuaran el --- atentado en el hotel Habana Libre.

As it has been said before, in June of this same year, a net of CIA agents, headed by - Ramón and María Leopoldina Grau Alsina ---- (known as Polita) were devoted to all type- of enemy activities, as well as others of - antisocial nature. For this purpose, they - made use of contacts with capitalist ------ representations in the country, which were- used as liaisons with the Central Intelli-- gence Agency.

These individuals were part of the organizations"Rescate","Movimiento Anticomunista Revolucionario" (MAR) and other organizations directed and sponsored by that Agency.

María Leopoldina Grau was given instructions by the CIA to plot for poisoning Primer Mi-- nister Fidel Castro,thereby,she was sent a - poisonous pill bottle,which was given to Alberto Cruz Caso,who,in turn,gave it to Jesús Campanioni Souza y Santos de la Caridad Pérez Núñez,members of the Organization(MAR), so - that they would commit the attempted crime - at the Havana Libre Hotel.

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Al fallar este intento, el contrarrevolucionario Tony Varona envió otro frasco con 500 cápsulas, a fin de tratar de realizar nuevamente el hecho.

Asimismo,"Polita" recibió de la CIA para -- iguales propósitos, varias armas con silenciadores y proyectiles especiales para atentados personales, las que fueron ocupadas - en junio de 1965, al ser detenidos estos -- elementos.

The counterrevolutionary Tony Varona sent another bottle with 500 capsules when --- this attempt failed, in order to try to - carry out the act again.

Likewise,"Polita" received from the CIA - some weapons with mufflers and special - projectiles for personal assassinations, - which were taken from them when arrested- in June, 1965.

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Una vez más, en 1965, la Agencia Central de Inteligencia intentó reagrupar las disper-- sas organizaciones contrarrevolucionarias,- bajo la denominada"Unidad Resistencia ----- (UNARE).

En estas actividades, los elementos contra- revolucionarios Enrique Abreu Vilahu,conoci do por Henry, Carlos Vicente Sánchez Hernan dez, Julio de las Nieves Ruiz Pitaluga y -- otros, planean un atentado contra el Coman- dante en Jefe, aprovechando su visita al -- restaurant "Vita Nuova",en el Vedado.En es- te lugar, Abreu Vilahu abriría fuego con -- una subametralladora Thompson contra el --- Primer Ministro y postas del Ministerio del Interior ubicadas frente al restaurant, a - fin de crear confusión y evadirse.

Al detenérseles, en julio de ese propio año, se les ocupó el material bélico para la rea lización de sus propósitos.

Once more, in 1965, the Central Intelligence Agency attempted to group the dispersed ---- counterrevolutionary organizations, under -- the named "Unidad Resistencia"(UNARE). In -- these activities, the counterrevolutionaries Enrique Abreu Vilahu, known as Henry, Carlos Vicente Sánchez Hernández, Julio de las Nie- ves Ruiz Pitaluga and others, plotted against the Commander in Chief, taking advantage of- his visit to Vita Nouva's restaurant, in the Vedado. In this place, Abreu Vilahu would -- open fire with a Thompson machine gun against the Prime Minister and the guards of the --- Ministry of the Interior building located -- across the restaurant, in order to create -- confusion and escape.

On being arrested on July of that same year, warlike material they had for the fulfillment of their purposes, was taken from them.

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También en 1966, fue detenido el ex-Comandante Rolando Cubela Secades, por ser el principal encartado en un plan de atentado contra el Primer Ministro. Dicho plan fue articulado por la CIA aprovhchando el viaje de Cubela a Madrid, lugar donde fue reclutado por los agentes de la CIA, Manuel Artime,Jorge Robreño conocido por el "Mago", luis Enrique Trasancos y Carlos Tepedino.

Igualmente intervinieron en los planes del atentado, los traidores José Luis González Gallarreta, funcionario de la embajada de Cuba en Madrid y Alberto Blanco conocido por "El Loco".

En la entrevista de Cubela con Manuel Artime éste último le garantizó la entrega de embarcaciones piratas, armas y hombres para una invasión que sería el complemento, en menos de 72 horas, de un atentado contra el Primer Ministro.

A tal efecto, antes de regresar Cubela a Cuba, recibió de José Luis González Gallarreta un fusil con mirilla telescópica y silenciador que le fue ocupado al ser detenido, conjuntamente con gran cantidad de armas y equipos que la CIA le había hecho llegar. También fueron detenidos Alberto Blanco Romariz y Jo

Being the principal indicted in a plan to kill the Prime Minister, the former Commander Rolando Cubela Secades was also arrested in 1965. That plan was prepared by the CIA, takin advantage Cubela's trip to Madrid, where he was recrutide by the CIA agents Manuel Artime, Jorge Robreño known as"The Magician" (El Mago), Luis Enrique Trasancos and Carlos Tepedino.

Others that also partipated in the plot, were the traitors José Luis Gonzalez Gallarreta official at the Cuban Embassy in Madrid and Alberto Blanco known as "The Crazy" (El Loco).

In the interview of Cubela with Manuel Artime, the later garanteed the delibery of pirate crafts, weapons and men for an invasion wich would support the plan for the assassination of the Prime Minister in les that 72 hours.

For that purpose, before Cubela came back to Cuba, he receiver from José Luis González Gallarreta a rifle with telescopic peephole and muffler, wich was taken from him when arrested, together with a great number of weapons and equipment that the CIA had sent to him. Alberto Blanco Romariz and José Luis-

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Dirigidos por la CIA, las organizaciones "Comando L" y "Movimiento 30 de Noviem-- bre", con representación en territorio - norteamericano,se dan a la tarea de pre- parar dos embarcaciones artilladas para- infiltrarse en nuestro país y realizar - actividades subversivas,a mediados de -- 1965.

Desisten de la infiltración y deciden ti rotear la zona de becados de Miramar y - el hotel Riviera,dirigiendo sus ataques- fundamentalmente contra la residencia -- del Presidente de la República.Después - de esta acción regresan a Estados Unidos.

En mayo de 1966, estos elementos se in-- filtraron por la zona de Monte Barreto,- en la capital,con la misión de realizar un atentado al Primer Ministro.En la ac- ción resultaron muertos Armando Romero - Martínez y Sandalio Herminio Díaz García, y detenidos: Antonio Cuesta Valle,cabe-- cilla principal de los"Comandos L",y Eu- genio Enrique Zaldívar Cárdenas,a quienes se les ocupó gran cantidad de equipos y- material bélico.

Estos elementos recibieron entrenamiento de la CIA en Puerto Rico y algunos de --

The "Comandos L" and the "Movimiento 30 de Noviembre", with representation in the U.S. territory, directed by the CIA,undertook - the task of making ready two crafts equip- ped with guns to be infitrated, and ----- committ subversive activities in our --- country, about the mid-1965.

They gave up the infiltration and decided to shoot at the scholarship zone in Miramar and at the Riviera Hotel,mainly in direction to the residence of the President of the -- Republic. After this action they returned - to the United States.

In May, 1966, these men were infiltrated by the Monte Barreto zone, in the capital,with the mission of assassinating the Primer -- Minister. In the action, Armando Romero Mar tinez y Sandalio Herminio Díaz García were killed, and Antonio Cuesta Valle, principal head of the "Comandos L", and Eugenio Enri que Zaldívar Cárdenas, were arrested and - a great number of equipment and warlike ma terial was taken from them.

These men were trainned by the CIA in Puer- to Rico, and some of them were the authors-

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ellos fueron los autores del cañoneo al buque mercante "San Pascual", fondeado en el Puerto de Caibarién, Las Villas.	of the bombardment to the "San Pascual" merchant vessel anchored at the Caibarién Port, in Las Villas Province.

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El 17 de marzo de 1967, resultaron detenidos Félix Asencio Crespo, Wilfredo Martínez Díaz y Gustavo Areces Alvarez, al tratar de infiltrarse por la zona de Cayo Fragoso, procedentes de Estados Unidos.

El objetivo principal que traían era realizar un atentado contra nuestro Primer Ministro y desatar una actividad sistemática de sabotajes con explosivos plásticos, todo ello complementado con ataques piratas, para dar la imagen en el exterior de actividades subversivas de grupos en distintas zonas y crear una situación que permitiera a las organizaciones contrarrevolucionarias radicadas en Estados Unidos, recabar ayuda oficial.

Para llevar a cabo sus actividades en territorio cubano, los mismos fueron entrenados por la CIA, a través de las organizaciones "M-30-11", "RECE", "Los Pinos Nuevos", "Comandos L", "Alpha-66" y otras.
Para esta misión se les facilitó todo el material bélico necesario.

Félix Asencio Crespo, Wilfredo Martínez Díaz and Gustavo Areces Alvarez were arrested on March 17th, while they tried to infiltrate by the Cayo Fragoso zone, coming from the United States.

The main objective they should carry out was to assassinate our Prime Minister and launch a sistematic activity of sabotage -- with plastic explosives, all that supported with pirate attacks, in order to give abroad an image of the existence of subversive --- activities in different areas and, thus, to create a situation which would permit the counterrrevolutionary organizations located in the United States to succeed in getting official support.

In order to carry out their activities in Cuban territory, they were trained by the CIA through the "M-30-11", "RECE", "Los Pinos Nuevos", "Comandos L", "Alpha-66" and others organizations. For this mission they were given all the neccessary warlike material.

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En 1971, con motivo del viaje del Comandan-
te en Jefe a Chile, se fragua un atentado -
en ese país, para el cual se unen la CIA, -
fascista chilenos y contrarrevolucionarios-
cubanos de la organización "Alpha-66".

El principal encartado en este plan era Je-
sús Domínguez Benítez, conocido por " El --
Isleño", para quien(a través de contrarrevo
lucionarios cubanos radicados en Venezuela)
se obtuvo documentación falsa que lo acredi
taba como periodista venezolano, lo que le-
permitió cubrir la visita de nuestro Primer
Ministro en dicho país.

El plan se ejecutaría mediante una pistola-
adaptada a una cámara de televisión, pero -
desistieron efectuarlo por considerar que -
no existían garantías para la conservación-
de sus vidas.

Domínguez Benítez, perteneció a la organiza
ción terrorista "Poder Cubano", fue acusado
por las autoridades norteamericanas de pro-
mover acciones terroristas en Estados Uni--
dos y otros países como miembro de dicha or
ganización, y arrestado por el FBI en 1968.

On 1971, due to Commander in Chief's trip to
Chile, a plot was elaborated in that country
for which the CIA, the Chilean fascists and
Cubans counterrevolutionaries from "Alpha 66"
organization came together.

The major indicted in this plan was Jesús Do
mínguez Benítez, known as"The Islander".
Through Cuban counterrevolutionaries settled
down at Venezuela, he obtained false documents
which identified him as a Venezuelan newspaper
man, which permitted him to report our Prime-
Minister's visit in that country.

The plan would be carried out using a gun ---
camouflaged into a television camera, but ---
they gave this up on considering there were -
no guarantees for the preservation of their -
lives.

Domínguez Benítez, belonged to the "Poder Cu
bano" terrorist organization. He was accused
by the American authorities of promoting ---
terrorist actions inside the United States -
and other countries, as a member of that or-
ganization, and was arrested by the FBI in -
1968!

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Sin embargo, en 1970 participa en el frustrado intento de infiltración del "Alpha-66" por Oriente, refugiándose en la Base Naval, donde nuevamente se le arrestó, esta vez, por infringir las condiciones de una fianza sobre una condena de 18 meses por la causa anteriormente mencionada.

No obstante, queda en libertad y sale sin dificultades de Estados Unidos a Sudamérica para participar en el atentado. Posteriormente regresa a Estados Unidos.

However, in 1970 he participated in the "Alpha-66" unsuccessful attempt of infiltration through Oriente Province, and sought refuge at the Naval Base, where he was arrested again, this time because he violated the conditions of a bond over an 18 months-condemn due to the trial just mentioned before.

Nevertheless, he is set free and leaves United States without any difficulty, and moves to South America in order to participate in the plot. Afterwards, he returns to the United States.

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Consideramos que el análisis de las informaciones que aportamos, las públicamente-conocidas y las que las autoridades norteamericanas poseen y no han sido publicadas, permiten afirmar que la eliminación-física de dirigentes de la Revolución Cubana, principalmente del Primer Ministro-Fidel Castro Ruz, ha constituído una política reiterada de los Estados Unidos a -- través de sus agencias subversivas, utilizando para ello a contrarrevolucionarios-cubanos, ciudadanos norteamericanos y todo tipo de elemento corrompido, tanto interna como externamente, sin tomar en consideración las víctimas que ocasionarían-estas acciones.

Con este objetivo han sido facilitadas en grandes cantidades, armas, explosivos, medios técnicos, de transporte y comunicación a los participantes, para la realización de sus planes.

Estos son algunos hechos connotados y comprobados de las numerosas actividades subversivas que ha realizado la CIA destinadas a la eliminación física de los dirigentes del Gobierno Revolucionario de -- Cuba

We consider that the analysis of the informations we offer, the publicly known, and the-ones that the American authorities possess -) and have not been published, allow us to --- affirm that the physical elimination of Cuban Revolutionary leaders, specially the Prime - Minister Fidel Castro Ruz, has been a reiterated policy of the United States through its -- subversive agencies, making use of Cuban ---- counterrevolutionaries, U.S. citizen and all-kind of corrupted individuals, inside the --- country as well as abroad, without taking --- into consideration the victims that would --- result from these actions.

With this purpose, they have provided the --- participants with a great number of weapons,- explosives, technical means of transportation and communication for the accomplishment of - their plans.

These are some of the coonoted and proved --- facts of the numerous subversive activities - that the CIA has carried out aimed to the --- assassination of the leaders of the Revolutionary Government of Cuba.